to have a creative mind

I Adj. (kreativ) creative; (produktiv) productive; eine schöpferische Pause einlegen have a break to get back into a creative frame of mind; umg., hum. pause for inspiration; eine schöpferische Krise a crisis in the creative process

II Adv.: schöpferisch veranlagt sein be very creative, have a creative mind

* * *

inventive; creative; productive

* * *

1. adj

2. adv

* * *

1) (having or showing the power and imagination to create: a creative dress-designer.) creative

2) creatively

3) fertile

* * *

I. adj creative

II. adv creatively; s.a. Augenblick, Pause

* * *

Adjektiv creative

adverbial creatively

* * *

A. adj (kreativ) creative; (produktiv) productive;

eine schöpferische Pause einlegen have a break to get back into a creative frame of mind; umg, hum pause for inspiration;

eine schöpferische Krise a crisis in the creative process

B. adv:

schöpferisch veranlagt sein be very creative, have a creative mind

* * *

Adjektiv creative

adverbial creatively

* * *

creative adj.

inventive adj. adv.

imaginatively adv.

inventively adv.

1) (intelligenza) intelligence, brains pl, (attitudine, talento) talent, (ingegnosità) ingenuity

2) (persona) mind

1) (intelligenza) intelligence, brains pl, (attitudine, talento) talent, (ingegnosità) ingenuity

2) (persona) mind

 ■ Aitchison, J. (1987). Noam Chomsky: Consensus and controversy. New York: Falmer Press.

 ■ Anderson, J. R. (1980). Cognitive psychology and its implications. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Anderson, J. R. (1995). Cognitive psychology and its implications (4th ed.). New York: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ Archilochus (1971). In M. L. West (Ed.), Iambi et elegi graeci (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 ■ Armstrong, D. M. (1990). The causal theory of the mind. In W. G. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and cognition: A reader (pp. 37-47). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. (Originally published in 1981 in The nature of mind and other essays, Ithaca, NY: University Press).

 ■ Atkins, P. W. (1992). Creation revisited. Oxford: W. H. Freeman & Company.

 ■ Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Bacon, F. (1878). Of the proficience and advancement of learning divine and human. In The works of Francis Bacon (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: Hurd & Houghton.

 ■ Bacon, R. (1928). Opus majus (Vol. 2). R. B. Burke (Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

 ■ Bar-Hillel, Y. (1960). The present status of automatic translation of languages. In F. L. Alt (Ed.), Advances in computers (Vol. 1). New York: Academic Press.

 ■ Barr, A., & E. A. Feigenbaum (Eds.) (1981). The handbook of artificial intelligence (Vol. 1). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

 ■ Barr, A., & E. A. Feigenbaum (Eds.) (1982). The handbook of artificial intelligence (Vol. 2). Los Altos, CA: William Kaufman.

 ■ Barron, F. X. (1963). The needs for order and for disorder as motives in creative activity. In C. W. Taylor & F. X. Barron (Eds.), Scientific creativity: Its rec ognition and development (pp. 153-160). New York: Wiley.

 ■ Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Bartley, S. H. (1969). Principles of perception. London: Harper & Row.

 ■ Barzun, J. (1959). The house of intellect. New York: Harper & Row.

 ■ Beach, F. A., D. O. Hebb, C. T. Morgan & H. W. Nissen (Eds.) (1960). The neu ropsychology of Lashley. New York: McGraw-Hill.

 ■ Berkeley, G. (1996). Principles of human knowledge: Three Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1710.)

 ■ Berlin, I. (1953). The hedgehog and the fox: An essay on Tolstoy's view of history. NY: Simon & Schuster.

 ■ Bierwisch, J. (1970). Semantics. In J. Lyons (Ed.), New horizons in linguistics. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

 ■ Black, H. C. (1951). Black's law dictionary. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.

 ■ Bloom, A. (1981). The linguistic shaping of thought: A study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

 ■ Bobrow, D. G., & D. A. Norman (1975). Some principles of memory schemata. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding: Stud ies in Cognitive Science (pp. 131-149). New York: Academic Press.

 ■ Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial intelligence and natural man. New York: Basic Books.

 ■ Boden, M. A. (1981). Minds and mechanisms. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

 ■ Boden, M. A. (1990a). The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms. London: Cardinal.

 ■ Boden, M. A. (1990b). The philosophy of artificial intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 ■ Boden, M. A. (1994). Precis of The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms. Behavioral and brain sciences 17, 519-570.

 ■ Boden, M. (1996). Creativity. In M. Boden (Ed.), Artificial Intelligence (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press.

 ■ Bolter, J. D. (1984). Turing's man: Western culture in the computer age. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

 ■ Bolton, N. (1972). The psychology of thinking. London: Methuen.

 ■ Bourne, L. E. (1973). Some forms of cognition: A critical analysis of several papers. In R. Solso (Ed.), Contemporary issues in cognitive psychology (pp. 313324). Loyola Symposium on Cognitive Psychology (Chicago 1972). Washington, DC: Winston.

 ■ Bransford, J. D., N. S. McCarrell, J. J. Franks & K. E. Nitsch (1977). Toward unexplaining memory. In R. Shaw & J. D. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, acting, and knowing (pp. 431-466). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Breger, L. (1981). Freud's unfinished journey. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

 ■ Brehmer, B. (1986). In one word: Not from experience. In H. R. Arkes & K. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader (pp. 705-719). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Bresnan, J. (1978). A realistic transformational grammar. In M. Halle, J. Bresnan & G. A. Miller (Eds.), Linguistic theory and psychological reality (pp. 1-59). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Brislin, R. W., W. J. Lonner & R. M. Thorndike (Eds.) (1973). Cross- cultural research methods. New York: Wiley.

 ■ Bronowski, J. (1977). A sense of the future: Essays in natural philosophy. P. E. Ariotti with R. Bronowski (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Bronowski, J. (1978). The origins of knowledge and imagination. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

 ■ Brown, R. O. (1973). A first language: The early stages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Brown, T. (1970). Lectures on the philosophy of the human mind. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 330-387). New York: Random House/Modern Library.

 ■ Bruner, J. S., J. Goodnow & G. Austin (1956). A study of thinking. New York: Wiley.

 ■ Calvin, W. H. (1990). The cerebral symphony: Seashore reflections on the structure of consciousness. New York: Bantam.

 ■ Campbell, J. (1982). Grammatical man: Information, entropy, language, and life. New York: Simon & Schuster.

 ■ Campbell, J. (1989). The improbable machine. New York: Simon & Schuster.

 ■ Carlyle, T. (1966). On heroes, hero- worship and the heroic in history. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. (Originally published in 1841.)

 ■ Carnap, R. (1959). The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language [Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache]. In A. J. Ayer (Ed.), Logical positivism (pp. 60-81) A. Pap (Trans). New York: Free Press. (Originally published in 1932.)

 ■ Cassirer, E. (1946). Language and myth. New York: Harper and Brothers. Reprinted. New York: Dover Publications, 1953.

 ■ Cattell, R. B., & H. J. Butcher (1970). Creativity and personality. In P. E. Vernon (Ed.), Creativity. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books.

 ■ Caudill, M., & C. Butler (1990). Naturally intelligent systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

 ■ Chandrasekaran, B. (1990). What kind of information processing is intelligence? A perspective on AI paradigms and a proposal. In D. Partridge & R. Wilks (Eds.), The foundations of artificial intelligence: A sourcebook (pp. 14-46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Charniak, E., & McDermott, D. (1985). Introduction to artificial intelligence. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

 ■ Chase, W. G., & H. A. Simon (1988). The mind's eye in chess. In A. Collins & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Readings in cognitive science: A perspective from psychology and artificial intelligence (pp. 461-493). San Mateo, CA: Kaufmann.

 ■ Cheney, D. L., & R. M. Seyfarth (1990). How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 ■ Chi, M.T.H., R. Glaser & E. Rees (1982). Expertise in problem solving. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (pp. 7-73). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton. Janua Linguarum.

 ■ Chomsky, N. (1964). A transformational approach to syntax. In J. A. Fodor & J. J. Katz (Eds.), The structure of language: Readings in the philosophy of lan guage (pp. 211-245). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

 ■ Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Chomsky, N. (1972). Language and mind (enlarged ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

 ■ Chomsky, N. (1979). Language and responsibility. New York: Pantheon.

 ■ Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of language: Its nature, origin and use. New York: Praeger Special Studies.

 ■ Churchland, P. (1979). Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

 ■ Clark, A. (1996). Philosophical Foundations. In M. A. Boden (Ed.), Artificial in telligence (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press.

 ■ Clark, H. H., & T. B. Carlson (1981). Context for comprehension. In J. Long & A. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and performance (Vol. 9, pp. 313-330). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Clarke, A. C. (1984). Profiles of the future: An inquiry into the limits of the possible. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

 ■ Claxton, G. (1980). Cognitive psychology: A suitable case for what sort of treatment? In G. Claxton (Ed.), Cognitive psychology: New directions (pp. 1-25). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

 ■ Code, M. (1985). Order and organism. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

 ■ Collingwood, R. G. (1972). The idea of history. New York: Oxford University Press.

 ■ Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self- esteem. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ Copland, A. (1952). Music and imagination. London: Oxford University Press.

 ■ Coren, S. (1994). The intelligence of dogs. New York: Bantam Books.

 ■ Cottingham, J. (Ed.) (1996). Western philosophy: An anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

 ■ Cox, C. (1926). The early mental traits of three hundred geniuses. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

 ■ Craik, K.J.W. (1943). The nature of explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Cronbach, L. J. (1990). Essentials of psychological testing (5th ed.). New York: HarperCollins.

 ■ Cronbach, L. J., & R. E. Snow (1977). Aptitudes and instructional methods. New York: Irvington. Paperback edition, 1981.

 ■ Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1993). The evolving self. New York: Harper Perennial.

 ■ Culler, J. (1976). Ferdinand de Saussure. New York: Penguin Books.

 ■ Curtius, E. R. (1973). European literature and the Latin Middle Ages. W. R. Trask (Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

 ■ D'Alembert, J.L.R. (1963). Preliminary discourse to the encyclopedia of Diderot. R. N. Schwab (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

 ■ Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: Avon.

 ■ Dampier, W. C. (1966). A history of modern science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Darwin, C. (1911). The life and letters of Charles Darwin (Vol. 1). Francis Darwin (Ed.). New York: Appleton.

 ■ Davidson, D. (1970) Mental events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory (pp. 79-101). Amherst: University of Massachussetts Press.

 ■ Davies, P. (1995). About time: Einstein's unfinished revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone.

 ■ Davis, R., & J. J. King (1977). An overview of production systems. In E. Elcock & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine intelligence 8. Chichester, England: Ellis Horwood.

 ■ Davis, R., & D. B. Lenat (1982). Knowledge- based systems in artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.

 ■ Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype: The gene as the unit of selection. Oxford: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ deKleer, J., & J. S. Brown (1983). Assumptions and ambiguities in mechanistic mental models (1983). In D. Gentner & A. L. Stevens (Eds.), Mental modes (pp. 155-190). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Dennett, D. C. (1978a). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.

 ■ Dennett, D. C. (1978b). Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In D. C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.

 ■ Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin's dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone.

 ■ Descartes, R. (1897-1910). Traite de l'homme. In Oeuvres de Descartes (Vol. 11, pp. 119-215). Paris: Charles Adam & Paul Tannery. (Originally published in 1634.)

 ■ Descartes, R. (1950). Discourse on method. L. J. Lafleur (Trans.). New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1637.)

 ■ Descartes, R. (1951). Meditation on first philosophy. L. J. Lafleur (Trans.). New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1641.)

 ■ Descartes, R. (1955). The philosophical works of Descartes. E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Trans.). New York: Dover. (Originally published in 1911 by Cambridge University Press.)

 ■ Descartes, R. (1967). Discourse on method (Pt. V). In E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 106-118). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1637.)

 ■ Descartes, R. (1970a). Discourse on method. In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 181-200). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1637.)

 ■ Descartes, R. (1970b). Principles of philosophy. In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 178-291). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1644.)

 ■ Descartes, R. (1984). Meditations on first philosophy. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murduch (Trans.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641.)

 ■ Descartes, R. (1986). Meditations on first philosophy. J. Cottingham (Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641 as Med itationes de prima philosophia.)

 ■ deWulf, M. (1956). An introduction to scholastic philosophy. Mineola, NY: Dover Books.

 ■ Dixon, N. F. (1981). Preconscious processing. London: Wiley.

 ■ Doyle, A. C. (1986). The Boscombe Valley mystery. In Sherlock Holmes: The com plete novels and stories (Vol. 1). New York: Bantam.

 ■ Dreyfus, H., & S. Dreyfus (1986). Mind over machine. New York: Free Press.

 ■ Dreyfus, H. L. (1972). What computers can't do: The limits of artificial intelligence (revised ed.). New York: Harper & Row.

 ■ Dreyfus, H. L., & S. E. Dreyfus (1986). Mind over machine: The power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer. New York: Free Press.

 ■ Edelman, G. M. (1992). Bright air, brilliant fire: On the matter of the mind. New York: Basic Books.

 ■ Ehrenzweig, A. (1967). The hidden order of art. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

 ■ Einstein, A., & L. Infeld (1938). The evolution of physics. New York: Simon & Schuster.

 ■ Eisenstein, S. (1947). Film sense. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

 ■ Everdell, W. R. (1997). The first moderns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 ■ Eysenck, M. W. (1977). Human memory: Theory, research and individual difference. Oxford: Pergamon.

 ■ Eysenck, M. W. (1982). Attention and arousal: Cognition and performance. Berlin: Springer.

 ■ Eysenck, M. W. (1984). A handbook of cognitive psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Fancher, R. E. (1979). Pioneers of psychology. New York: W. W. Norton.

 ■ Farrell, B. A. (1981). The standing of psychoanalysis. New York: Oxford University Press.

 ■ Feldman, D. H. (1980). Beyond universals in cognitive development. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

 ■ Fetzer, J. H. (1996). Philosophy and cognitive science (2nd ed.). New York: Paragon House.

 ■ Finke, R. A. (1990). Creative imagery: Discoveries and inventions in visualization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Flanagan, O. (1991). The science of the mind. Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

 ■ Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

 ■ Frege, G. (1972). Conceptual notation. T. W. Bynum (Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Originally published in 1879.)

 ■ Frege, G. (1979). Logic. In H. Hermes, F. Kambartel & F. Kaulbach (Eds.), Gottlob Frege: Posthumous writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Originally published in 1879-1891.)

 ■ Freud, S. (1959). Creative writers and day-dreaming. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 9, pp. 143-153). London: Hogarth Press.

 ■ Freud, S. (1966). Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The stan dard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 1, pp. 295-398). London: Hogarth Press. (Originally published in 1950 as Aus den AnfaЁngen der Psychoanalyse, in London by Imago Publishing.)

 ■ Freud, S. (1976). Lecture 18-Fixation to traumas-the unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 16, p. 285). London: Hogarth Press.

 ■ Galileo, G. (1990). Il saggiatore [The assayer]. In S. Drake (Ed.), Discoveries and opinions of Galileo. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1623.)

 ■ Gassendi, P. (1970). Letter to Descartes. In "Objections and replies." In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 2, pp. 179-240). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641.)

 ■ Gazzaniga, M. S. (1988). Mind matters: How mind and brain interact to create our conscious lives. Boston: Houghton Mifflin in association with MIT Press/Bradford Books.

 ■ Genesereth, M. R., & N. J. Nilsson (1987). Logical foundations of artificial intelligence. Palo Alto, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.

 ■ Ghiselin, B. (1952). The creative process. New York: Mentor.

 ■ Ghiselin, B. (1985). The creative process. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1952.)

 ■ Gilhooly, K. J. (1996). Thinking: Directed, undirected and creative (3rd ed.). London: Academic Press.

 ■ Glass, A. L., K. J. Holyoak & J. L. Santa (1979). Cognition. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley.

 ■ Goody, J. (1977). The domestication of the savage mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Gruber, H. E. (1980). Darwin on man: A psychological study of scientific creativity (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 ■ Gruber, H. E., & S. Davis (1988). Inching our way up Mount Olympus: The evolving systems approach to creative thinking. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Guthrie, E. R. (1972). The psychology of learning. New York: Harper. (Originally published in 1935.)

 ■ Habermas, J. (1972). Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press.

 ■ Hadamard, J. (1945). The psychology of invention in the mathematical field. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

 ■ Hand, D. J. (1985). Artificial intelligence and psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Harris, M. (1981). The language myth. London: Duckworth.

 ■ Haugeland, J. (Ed.) (1981). Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

 ■ Haugeland, J. (1981a). The nature and plausibility of cognitivism. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 243-281). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Haugeland, J. (1981b). Semantic engines: An introduction to mind design. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 1-34). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

 ■ Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial intelligence: The very idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Hawkes, T. (1977). Structuralism and semiotics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 ■ Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organisation of behaviour. New York: Wiley.

 ■ Hebb, D. O. (1958). A textbook of psychology. Philadelphia: Saunders.

 ■ Hegel, G.W.F. (1910). The phenomenology of mind. J. B. Baille (Trans.). London: Sonnenschein. (Originally published as Phaenomenologie des Geistes, 1807.)

 ■ Heisenberg, W. (1958). Physics and philosophy. New York: Harper & Row.

 ■ Hempel, C. G. (1966). Philosophy of natural science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall.

 ■ Herman, A. (1997). The idea of decline in Western history. New York: Free Press.

 ■ Herrnstein, R. J., & E. G. Boring (Eds.) (1965). A source book in the history of psy chology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Herzmann, E. (1964). Mozart's creative process. In P. H. Lang (Ed.), The creative world of Mozart (pp. 17-30). London: Oldbourne Press.

 ■ Hilgard, E. R. (1957). Introduction to psychology. London: Methuen.

 ■ Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. London: Crooke.

 ■ Hofstadter, D. R. (1979). Goedel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid. New York: Basic Books.

 ■ Holliday, S. G., & M. J. Chandler (1986). Wisdom: Explorations in adult competence. Basel, Switzerland: Karger.

 ■ Horn, J. L. (1986). In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (Vol. 3). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

 ■ Hull, C. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

 ■ Hume, D. (1955). An inquiry concerning human understanding. New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1748.)

 ■ Hume, D. (1975). An enquiry concerning human understanding. In L. A. SelbyBigge (Ed.), Hume's enquiries (3rd. ed., revised P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon. (Spelling and punctuation revised.) (Originally published in 1748.)

 ■ Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), Hume's enquiries (3rd. ed., revised P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon. (With some modifications of spelling and punctuation.) (Originally published in 1690.)

 ■ Hunt, E. (1973). The memory we must have. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language. (pp. 343-371) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

 ■ Inhelder, B., & J. Piaget (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence. New York: Basic Books. (Originally published in 1955 as De la logique de l'enfant a` la logique de l'adolescent. [Paris: Presses Universitaire de France])

 ■ James, W. (1890a). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Dover Books.

 ■ James, W. (1890b). The principles of psychology. New York: Henry Holt.

 ■ Jevons, W. S. (1900). The principles of science (2nd ed.). London: Macmillan.

 ■ Johnson, G. (1986). Machinery of the mind: Inside the new science of artificial intelli gence. New York: Random House.

 ■ Johnson, M. L. (1988). Mind, language, machine. New York: St. Martin's Press.

 ■ Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Toward a cognitive science of language, inference, and consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1988). The computer and the mind: An introduction to cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Jones, E. (1961). The life and work of Sigmund Freud. L. Trilling & S. Marcus (Eds.). London: Hogarth.

 ■ Jones, R. V. (1985). Complementarity as a way of life. In A. P. French & P. J. Kennedy (Eds.), Niels Bohr: A centenary volume. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Kant, I. (1933). Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed.). N. K. Smith (Trans.). London: Macmillan. (Originally published in 1781 as Kritik der reinen Vernunft.)

 ■ Kant, I. (1891). Solution of the general problems of the Prolegomena. In E. Belfort (Trans.), Kant's Prolegomena. London: Bell. (With minor modifications.) (Originally published in 1783.)

 ■ Katona, G. (1940). Organizing and memorizing: Studies in the psychology of learning and teaching. New York: Columbia University Press.

 ■ Kaufman, A. S. (1979). Intelligent testing with the WISC-R. New York: Wiley.

 ■ Koestler, A. (1964). The act of creation. New York: Arkana (Penguin).

 ■ Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. (pp. 151-235) New York: Academic Press.

 ■ KoЁhler, W. (1925). The mentality of apes. New York: Liveright.

 ■ KoЁhler, W. (1927). The mentality of apes (2nd ed.). Ella Winter (Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

 ■ KoЁhler, W. (1930). Gestalt psychology. London: G. Bell.

 ■ KoЁhler, W. (1947). Gestalt psychology. New York: Liveright.

 ■ KoЁhler, W. (1969). The task of Gestalt psychology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

 ■ Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 ■ Langer, E. J. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

 ■ Langer, S. (1962). Philosophical sketches. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

 ■ Langley, P., H. A. Simon, G. L. Bradshaw & J. M. Zytkow (1987). Scientific dis covery: Computational explorations of the creative process. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Lashley, K. S. (1951). The problem of serial order in behavior. In L. A. Jeffress (Ed.), Cerebral mechanisms in behavior, the Hixon Symposium (pp. 112-146) New York: Wiley.

 ■ LeDoux, J. E., & W. Hirst (1986). Mind and brain: Dialogues in cognitive neuroscience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Lehnert, W. (1978). The process of question answering. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Leiber, J. (1991). Invitation to cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell.

 ■ Lenat, D. B., & G. Harris (1978). Designing a rule system that searches for scientific discoveries. In D. A. Waterman & F. Hayes-Roth (Eds.), Pattern directed inference systems (pp. 25-52) New York: Academic Press.

 ■ Levenson, T. (1995). Measure for measure: A musical history of science. New York: Touchstone. (Originally published in 1994.)

 ■ Leґvi-Strauss, C. (1963). Structural anthropology. C. Jacobson & B. Grundfest Schoepf (Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Originally published in 1958.)

 ■ Levine, M. W., & J. M. Schefner (1981). Fundamentals of sensation and perception. London: Addison-Wesley.

 ■ Lewis, C. I. (1946). An analysis of knowledge and valuation. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.

 ■ Lighthill, J. (1972). A report on artificial intelligence. Unpublished manuscript, Science Research Council.

 ■ Lipman, M., A. M. Sharp & F. S. Oscanyan (1980). Philosophy in the classroom. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

 ■ Lippmann, W. (1965). Public opinion. New York: Free Press. (Originally published in 1922.)

 ■ Locke, J. (1956). An essay concerning human understanding. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. (Originally published in 1690.)

 ■ Locke, J. (1975). An essay concerning human understanding. P. H. Nidditch (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon. (Originally published in 1690.) (With spelling and punctuation modernized and some minor modifications of phrasing.)

 ■ Lopate, P. (1994). The art of the personal essay. New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books.

 ■ Lorimer, F. (1929). The growth of reason. London: Kegan Paul. Machlup, F., & U. Mansfield (Eds.) (1983). The study of information. New York: Wiley.

 ■ Manguel, A. (1996). A history of reading. New York: Viking.

 ■ Margolis, H. (1987). Patterns, thinking, and cognition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 ■ Markey, J. F. (1928). The symbolic process. London: Kegan Paul.

 ■ Martin, R. M. (1969). On Ziff's "Natural and formal languages." In S. Hook (Ed.), Language and philosophy: A symposium (pp. 249-263). New York: New York University Press.

 ■ Mazlish, B. (1993). The fourth discontinuity: the co- evolution of humans and machines. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

 ■ McCarthy, J., & P. J. Hayes (1969). Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. In B. Meltzer & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine intelligence 4. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

 ■ McClelland, J. L., D. E. Rumelhart & G. E. Hinton (1986). The appeal of parallel distributed processing. In D. E. Rumelhart, J. L. McClelland & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the mi crostructure of cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 3-40). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.

 ■ McCorduck, P. (1979). Machines who think. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ McLaughlin, T. (1970). Music and communication. London: Faber & Faber.

 ■ Mednick, S. A. (1962). The associative basis of the creative process. Psychological Review 69, 431-436.

 ■ Meehl, P. E., & C. J. Golden (1982). Taxometric methods. In Kendall, P. C., & Butcher, J. N. (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in clinical psychology (pp. 127-182). New York: Wiley.

 ■ Mehler, J., E.C.T. Walker & M. Garrett (Eds.) (1982). Perspectives on mental rep resentation: Experimental and theoretical studies of cognitive processes and ca pacities. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Mill, J. S. (1900). A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive: Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. London: Longmans, Green.

 ■ Miller, G. A. (1979, June). A very personal history. Talk to the Cognitive Science Workshop, Cambridge, MA.

 ■ Miller, J. (1983). States of mind. New York: Pantheon Books.

 ■ Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In P. H. Winston (Ed.), The psychology of computer vision (pp. 211-277). New York: McGrawHill.

 ■ Minsky, M., & S. Papert (1973). Artificial intelligence. Condon Lectures, Oregon State System of Higher Education, Eugene, Oregon.

 ■ Minsky, M. L. (1986). The society of mind. New York: Simon & Schuster.

 ■ Mischel, T. (1976). Psychological explanations and their vicissitudes. In J. K. Cole & W. J. Arnold (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on motivation (Vol. 23). Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press.

 ■ Morford, M.P.O., & R. J. Lenardon (1995). Classical mythology (5th ed.). New York: Longman.

 ■ Murdoch, I. (1954). Under the net. New York: Penguin.

 ■ Nagel, E. (1959). Methodological issues in psychoanalytic theory. In S. Hook (Ed.), Psychoanalysis, scientific method, and philosophy: A symposium. New York: New York University Press.

 ■ Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal questions. London: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 ■ Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

 ■ Neisser, U. (1972). Changing conceptions of imagery. In P. W. Sheehan (Ed.), The function and nature of imagery (pp. 233-251). London: Academic Press.

 ■ Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: What are the important questions? In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory (pp. 3-24). London: Academic Press.

 ■ Neisser, U. (1979). The concept of intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg & D. K. Detterman (Eds.), Human intelligence: Perspectives on its theory and measurement (pp. 179-190). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

 ■ Nersessian, N. (1992). How do scientists think? Capturing the dynamics of conceptual change in science. In R. N. Giere (Ed.), Cognitive models of science (pp. 3-44). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

 ■ Newell, A. (1973a). Artificial intelligence and the concept of mind. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 1-60). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ Newell, A. (1973b). You can't play 20 questions with nature and win. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing (pp. 283-310). New York: Academic Press.

 ■ Newell, A., & H. A. Simon (1963). GPS: A program that simulates human thought. In E. A. Feigenbaum & J. Feldman (Eds.), Computers and thought (pp. 279-293). New York & McGraw-Hill.

 ■ Newell, A., & H. A. Simon (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

 ■ Nietzsche, F. (1966). Beyond good and evil. W. Kaufmann (Trans.). New York: Vintage. (Originally published in 1885.)

 ■ Nilsson, N. J. (1971). Problem- solving methods in artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.

 ■ Nussbaum, M. C. (1978). Aristotle's Princeton University Press. De Motu Anamalium. Princeton, NJ:

 ■ Oersted, H. C. (1920). Thermo-electricity. In Kirstine Meyer (Ed.), H. C. Oersted, Natuurvidenskabelige Skrifter (Vol. 2). Copenhagen: n.p. (Originally published in 1830 in The Edinburgh encyclopaedia.)

 ■ Ong, W. J. (1982). Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word. London: Methuen.

 ■ Onians, R. B. (1954). The origins of European thought. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Osgood, C. E. (1960). Method and theory in experimental psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1953.)

 ■ Osgood, C. E. (1966). Language universals and psycholinguistics. In J. H. Greenberg (Ed.), Universals of language (2nd ed., pp. 299-322). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Palmer, R. E. (1969). Hermeneutics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

 ■ Peirce, C. S. (1934). Some consequences of four incapacities-Man, a sign. In C. Hartsborne & P. Weiss (Eds.), Collected papers of Charles Saunders Peirce (Vol. 5, pp. 185-189). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Penfield, W. (1959). In W. Penfield & L. Roberts, Speech and brain mechanisms. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

 ■ Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the mind: A search for the missing science of conscious ness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 ■ Perkins, D. N. (1981). The mind's best work. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Peterfreund, E. (1986). The heuristic approach to psychoanalytic therapy. In

 ■ J. Reppen (Ed.), Analysts at work, (pp. 127-144). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.

 ■ Piaget, J. (1952). The origin of intelligence in children. New York: International Universities Press. (Originally published in 1936.)

 ■ Piaget, J. (1954). Le langage et les opeґrations intellectuelles. Proble` mes de psycho linguistique. Symposium de l'Association de Psychologie Scientifique de Langue Francёaise. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

 ■ Piaget, J. (1977). Problems of equilibration. In H. E. Gruber & J. J. Voneche (Eds.), The essential Piaget (pp. 838-841). London: Routlege & Kegan Paul. (Originally published in 1975 as L'eґquilibration des structures cognitives [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France].)

 ■ Piaget, J., & B. Inhelder. (1973). Memory and intelligence. New York: Basic Books.

 ■ Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct. New York: Morrow.

 ■ Pinker, S. (1996). Facts about human language relevant to its evolution. In J.-P. Changeux & J. Chavaillon (Eds.), Origins of the human brain. A symposium of the Fyssen foundation (pp. 262-283). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Planck, M. (1949). Scientific autobiography and other papers. F. Gaynor (Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library.

 ■ Planck, M. (1990). Wissenschaftliche Selbstbiographie. W. Berg (Ed.). Halle, Germany: Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina.

 ■ Plato (1892). Meno. In The Dialogues of Plato (B. Jowett, Trans.; Vol. 2). New York: Clarendon. (Originally published circa 380 B.C.)

 ■ Poincareґ, H. (1913). Mathematical creation. In The foundations of science. G. B. Halsted (Trans.). New York: Science Press.

 ■ Poincareґ, H. (1921). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. G. B. Halstead (Trans.). New York: Science Press.

 ■ Poincareґ, H. (1929). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. New York: Science Press.

 ■ Poincareґ, H. (1952). Science and method. F. Maitland (Trans.) New York: Dover.

 ■ Polya, G. (1945). How to solve it. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

 ■ Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

 ■ Popper, K. (1968). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York: Harper & Row/Basic Books.

 ■ Popper, K., & J. Eccles (1977). The self and its brain. New York: Springer-Verlag.

 ■ Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.

 ■ Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Putnam, H. (1987). The faces of realism. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.

 ■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1981). The imagery debate: Analog media versus tacit knowledge. In N. Block (Ed.), Imagery (pp. 151-206). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Towards a foundation for cog nitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

 ■ Quillian, M. R. (1968). Semantic memory. In M. Minsky (Ed.), Semantic information processing (pp. 216-260). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Rabbitt, P.M.A., & S. Dornic (Eds.). Attention and performance (Vol. 5). London: Academic Press.

 ■ Rawlins, G.J.E. (1997). Slaves of the Machine: The quickening of computer technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

 ■ Reid, T. (1970). An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 151-178). New York: Random House/Modern Library.

 ■ Reitman, W. (1970). What does it take to remember? In D. A. Norman (Ed.), Models of human memory (pp. 470-510). London: Academic Press.

 ■ Ricoeur, P. (1974). Structure and hermeneutics. In D. I. Ihde (Ed.), The conflict of interpretations: Essays in hermeneutics (pp. 27-61). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

 ■ Robinson, D. N. (1986). An intellectual history of psychology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

 ■ Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

 ■ Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. In N. Warren (Ed.), Studies in cross cultural psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 1-49) London: Academic Press.

 ■ Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 27-48). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Rosch, E., & B. B. Lloyd (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Rose, S. (1970). The chemistry of life. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

 ■ Rose, S. (1976). The conscious brain (updated ed.). New York: Random House.

 ■ Rose, S. (1993). The making of memory: From molecules to mind. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1992)

 ■ Roszak, T. (1994). The cult of information: A neo- Luddite treatise on high- tech, artificial intelligence, and the true art of thinking (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.

 ■ Royce, J. R., & W. W. Rozeboom (Eds.) (1972). The psychology of knowing. New York: Gordon & Breach.

 ■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1977). Introduction to human information processing. New York: Wiley.

 ■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. Bruce & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Rumelhart, D. E., & J. L. McClelland (1986). On learning the past tenses of English verbs. In J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Rumelhart, D. E., P. Smolensky, J. L. McClelland & G. E. Hinton (1986). Schemata and sequential thought processes in PDP models. In J. L. McClelland, D. E. Rumelhart & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel Distributed Processing (Vol. 2, pp. 7-57). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Russell, B. (1927). An outline of philosophy. London: G. Allen & Unwin.

 ■ Russell, B. (1961). History of Western philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.

 ■ Russell, B. (1965). How I write. In Portraits from memory and other essays. London: Allen & Unwin.

 ■ Russell, B. (1992). In N. Griffin (Ed.), The selected letters of Bertrand Russell (Vol. 1), The private years, 1884- 1914. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Ryecroft, C. (1966). Psychoanalysis observed. London: Constable.

 ■ Sagan, C. (1978). The dragons of Eden: Speculations on the evolution of human intel ligence. New York: Ballantine Books.

 ■ Salthouse, T. A. (1992). Expertise as the circumvention of human processing limitations. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Sanford, A. J. (1987). The mind of man: Models of human understanding. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

 ■ Sapir, E. (1921). Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.

 ■ Sapir, E. (1964). Culture, language, and personality. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1941.)

 ■ Sapir, E. (1985). The status of linguistics as a science. In D. G. Mandelbaum (Ed.), Selected writings of Edward Sapir in language, culture and personality (pp. 160166). Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1929).

 ■ Scardmalia, M., & C. Bereiter (1992). Literate expertise. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Schafer, R. (1954). Psychoanalytic interpretation in Rorschach testing. New York: Grune & Stratten.

 ■ Schank, R. C. (1973). Identification of conceptualizations underlying natural language. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 187-248). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ Schank, R. C. (1976). The role of memory in language processing. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), The structure of human memory. (pp. 162-189) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ Schank, R. C. (1986). Explanation patterns: Understanding mechanically and creatively. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Schank, R. C., & R. P. Abelson (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ SchroЁdinger, E. (1951). Science and humanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Searle, J. R. (1981a). Minds, brains, and programs. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 282-306). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Searle, J. R. (1981b). Minds, brains and programs. In D. Hofstadter & D. Dennett (Eds.), The mind's I (pp. 353-373). New York: Basic Books.

 ■ Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Serres, M. (1982). The origin of language: Biology, information theory, and thermodynamics. M. Anderson (Trans.). In J. V. Harari & D. F. Bell (Eds.), Hermes: Literature, science, philosophy (pp. 71-83). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

 ■ Simon, H. A. (1966). Scientific discovery and the psychology of problem solving. In R. G. Colodny (Ed.), Mind and cosmos: Essays in contemporary science and philosophy (pp. 22-40). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

 ■ Simon, H. A. (1979). Models of thought. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

 ■ Simon, H. A. (1989). The scientist as a problem solver. In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert Simon. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Simon, H. A., & C. Kaplan (1989). Foundations of cognitive science. In M. Posner (Ed.), Foundations of cognitive science (pp. 1-47). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Simonton, D. K. (1988). Creativity, leadership and chance. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Knopf.

 ■ Smith, E. E. (1988). Concepts and thought. In J. Sternberg & E. E. Smith (Eds.), The psychology of human thought (pp. 19-49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Smith, E. E. (1990). Thinking: Introduction. In D. N. Osherson & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Thinking. An invitation to cognitive science. (Vol. 3, pp. 1-2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Socrates. (1958). Meno. In E. H. Warmington & P. O. Rouse (Eds.), Great dialogues of Plato W.H.D. Rouse (Trans.). New York: New American Library. (Original publication date unknown.)

 ■ Solso, R. L. (1974). Theories of retrieval. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Theories in cognitive psychology. Potomac, MD: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Spencer, H. (1896). The principles of psychology. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts.

 ■ Steiner, G. (1975). After Babel: Aspects of language and translation. New York: Oxford University Press.

 ■ Sternberg, R. J. (1977). Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

 ■ Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg, Thinking and problem solving. San Diego: Academic Press.

 ■ Sternberg, R. J., & J. E. Davidson (1985). Cognitive development in gifted and talented. In F. D. Horowitz & M. O'Brien (Eds.), The gifted and talented (pp. 103-135). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

 ■ Storr, A. (1993). The dynamics of creation. New York: Ballantine Books. (Originally published in 1972.)

 ■ Stumpf, S. E. (1994). Philosophy: History and problems (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

 ■ Sulloway, F. J. (1996). Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives. New York: Random House/Vintage Books.

 ■ Thorndike, E. L. (1906). Principles of teaching. New York: A. G. Seiler.

 ■ Thorndike, E. L. (1970). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. Darien, CT: Hafner Publishing Co. (Originally published in 1911.)

 ■ Titchener, E. B. (1910). A textbook of psychology. New York: Macmillan.

 ■ Titchener, E. B. (1914). A primer of psychology. New York: Macmillan.

 ■ Toulmin, S. (1957). The philosophy of science. London: Hutchinson.

 ■ Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organisation of memory. London: Academic Press.

 ■ Turing, A. (1946). In B. E. Carpenter & R. W. Doran (Eds.), ACE reports of 1946 and other papers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Turkle, S. (1984). Computers and the second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York: Simon & Schuster.

 ■ Tyler, S. A. (1978). The said and the unsaid: Mind, meaning, and culture. New York: Academic Press.

 ■ van Heijenoort (Ed.) (1967). From Frege to Goedel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.

 ■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1991a). Artificial intelligence and human cognition: A theoretical inter comparison of two realms of intellect. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1991b). Cognitive science and concepts of mind: Toward a general theory of human and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1993). Cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence: Theory and re search in cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1995). The sciences of cognition: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1996). Human intellect and cognitive science: Toward a general unified theory of intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1998b). Language and thought in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology, artificial intelligence, and neural science. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1998c). The ultimate objectives of artificial intelligence: Theoretical and research foundations, philosophical and psychological implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wagman, M. (2000). Scientific discovery processes in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.

 ■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

 ■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

 ■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 ■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 ■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.

 ■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.

 ■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.

 ■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. New York: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

 ■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.

 ■ Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.

 ■ Whorf, B. L. (1956). In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Whyte, L. L. (1962). The unconscious before Freud. New York: Anchor Books.

 ■ Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

 ■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.

 ■ Winston, P. H. (1987). Artificial intelligence: A perspective. In E. L. Grimson & R. S. Patil (Eds.), AI in the 1980s and beyond (pp. 1-12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 ■ Winston, P. H. (Ed.) (1975). The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.

 ■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

 ■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.

 ■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.

 ■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).

 ■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.

 ■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.

 ■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.

 ■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

   1) There Are Ideas That Have Their Own True and Immutable Nature

   And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)

   2) Examine What Is within Our Reach

   Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)

   3) Modern Philosophy Starts with the Cartesian Catastrophe

   As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)

   4) The Rightful Claims of Philosophy

   It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)

   5) The Philosophy of Philosophy

   Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)

   6) Philosophy Is a Field Which Has Certain Central Questions

   I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)

   7) The Central Task of Philosophy

   What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.

   This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).

   The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....

   Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)

   8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science

   In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)

   9) The Enduring Value of Philosophy

   Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....

   Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)

    10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- Control

   In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

1 to stop.

consiguieron detener la hemorragia they managed to stop the bleeding

estaba decidido, nada podía detenerlo he had made up his mind, nothing could stop him

Ricardo detuvo el auto Richard stopped the car.

El guarda detuvo el asalto The guard stopped the holdup.

2 to arrest.

El guarda detuvo al ladrón The guard arrested the thief.

3 to keep, to delay.

4 to hold back, to delay, to block someone's progress, to block the progress of.

La falta de luz detuvo al tren The lack of lighting held back the train.

* * *

Conjugation model [ TENER], like link=tener tener

► verbo transitivo

1 (parar) to stop, halt; (proceso, negociación) to hold up

2 (retener) to keep, delay, detain

■ nos detuvo durante una hora she kept us for an hour

3 DERECHO to detain, arrest

► verbo pronominal detenerse

1 (pararse) to stop, halt

■ el tren se detuvo the train stopped

2 (entretenerse) to hang about, linger

3 (pararse a considerar algo) to dwell

■ no podemos detenernos en este asunto we can't dwell upon this matter

* * *

1) to arrest, detain

2) stop, halt

•

- detenerse

* * *

1. VT

1) (=parar) to stop

2) (=retrasar) to hold up, delay

3) (=retener) [+ objeto] to keep

4) (Jur) (=arrestar) to arrest; (=encarcelar) to detain

detenerse

* * *

verbo transitivo

1) ( parar) <vehículo/máquina> to stop; <trámite/proceso> to halt; < hemorragia> to stop, staunch

2) ( arrestar) to arrest; ( encarcelar) to detain

detenerse v pron

a) ( pararse) vehículo/persona to stop

b) ( tomar mucho tiempo)

* * *

= halt, stop, suspend, staunch [stanch, -USA], check, detain, stunt, stem + the tide of, arrest, apprehend, shut down, imprison, jail [gaol, -UK], make + an arrest, place under + arrest, take into + custody, pull over.

Nota: Referido generalmente a la policía de tráfico.

Ex. Consequently, a freeze-frame or still-picture effect can be achieved by simply halting the movement of the head across the disc.

Ex. Program function key 1 (FP1) tells DOBIS/LIBIS to stop whatever it is doing and go back to the function selection screen.

Ex. The appearance of this volume aroused such a furor within and without the British Museum that further publication of the catalog was suspended.

Ex. Some notable progress is being made worldwide in staunching publishers' losses.

Ex. They concluded that 'our citizens may rationally prefer to check crime and disorder by ounces of educational prevention, than by pounds of cure in the shape of large 'lockups' and expensive suits before the law'.

Ex. Juan Carlos is a blind lawyer, activist and volunteer librarian who has been imprisoned without trial since March, when he was detained for peacefully protesting the arrest of a journalist.

Ex. True personal discrimination cannot be forced by exercises in selecting the good and rejecting the bad by the application of stock critical formulas: it may indeed be stunted.

Ex. This article discusses some strategies that are being developed to stem the tide of losses caused worldwide by piracy.

Ex. Librarians have been known to devote time to entrap and arrest individuals who use the library toilets for sexual purposes = Hay casos de bibliotecarios que han dedicado tiempo a atrapar y detener a individuos que utilizan los servicios de la biblioteca con fines sexuales.

Ex. Due to this fortunate circumstance, a thief who had been systematically purloining rare books from the Library was apprehended.

Ex. Cyberattacks involve routers acting at a predesignated time or trigger time and flooding various targeted Web sites with data -- effectively shutting down the Web site.

Ex. Juan Carlos is a blind lawyer, activist and volunteer librarian who has been imprisoned without trial since March, when he was detained for peacefully protesting the arrest of a journalist.

Ex. In 1892 Klas Linderfelt, the then ALA President, was jailed for 4 days on charges of embezzling more than $4,000 from library funds.

Ex. They do do everything from issuing parking and speeding tickets to making arrests.

Ex. The driver was placed under arrest by the state police for driving while under the influence of alcohol.

Ex. A couple convicted of tax evasion was taken into custody after a five-month-long standoff with federal agents.

Ex. Since cops were given the go-ahead to pull over people for not wearing seat belts, state troopers have become creative about spotting scofflaws.

----

* continuar sin detenerse = go straight ahead.

* detener bruscamente = halt + in full flight.

* detener búsqueda = discontinue + search.

* detener completamente = bring to + a (grinding) halt.

* detener en el camino = waylay.

* detenerse = become + stagnant, break off, sit back, stall, pull up, run into + the sand(s), stop over.

* detenerse antes de = stop + short of.

* detenerse a pensar = pause + to think, step back, take + a step back.

* detenerse a pensar en = spare + a thought for.

* detenerse a reflexionar = stand back.

* detenerse completamente = grind to + a (screeching) halt, come to + a (dead) halt, come to + a shuddering halt.

* detenerse en el camino = stop along + the way.

* detenerse en el lado del camino = pull over.

* detenerse por completo = come to + a standstill, be at a standstill.

* detenerse por un momento = pause.

* estar detenido = be under arrest.

* ser detenido = be under arrest.

* si nos detenemos a reflexionar sobre ello = on reflection.

* * *

verbo transitivo

1) ( parar) <vehículo/máquina> to stop; <trámite/proceso> to halt; < hemorragia> to stop, staunch

2) ( arrestar) to arrest; ( encarcelar) to detain

detenerse v pron

a) ( pararse) vehículo/persona to stop

b) ( tomar mucho tiempo)

* * *

= halt, stop, suspend, staunch [stanch, -USA], check, detain, stunt, stem + the tide of, arrest, apprehend, shut down, imprison, jail [gaol, -UK], make + an arrest, place under + arrest, take into + custody, pull over.

Nota: Referido generalmente a la policía de tráfico.

* * *

detener [ E27 ]

A (parar) ‹vehículo/máquina› to stop; ‹trámite/proceso› to halt; ‹hemorragia› to stop, staunch

detener el avance del enemigo to halt the enemy advance

detener el avance de la enfermedad to curb o check o arrest the development of the disease

vete si quieres, nadie te detiene go if you want, nobody's stopping you

B (arrestar) to arrest; (encarcelar) to detain

¡queda usted detenido! you're under arrest!

C (Dep) ‹gol/lanzamiento› to save; (balón) to stop

1 (pararse) «vehículo/persona» to stop

ven directo a casa, sin detenerte en el camino come straight home without stopping off on the way

detenerse A + INF to stop to + INF

¿te has detenido a pensar en las consecuencias? have you stopped to consider the consequences?

(tomar mucho tiempo): me detuve arreglando el escritorio y perdí el tren I hung around tidying my desk and I missed the train

hay que ir al grano sin detenerse en lo accesorio we have to get to the point without dwelling on incidentals

no te detengas en la introducción don't waste time o spend too much time on the introduction

* * *

◊ ¡queda usted detenido! you're under arrest!

a) ( pararse) [vehículo/persona] to stop;

b) ( tomar mucho tiempo) detenerse en algo:

◊ no nos detengamos demasiado en los detalles let's not spend too much time discussing the details

* * *

♦ vt

1. [parar] to stop;

detenga el vehículo y estacione stop the vehicle and park;

detener el avance enemigo to halt the enemy advance;

detener la propagación de la epidemia to stop the spread of the epidemic;

los bomberos lograron detener el fuego firefighters managed to hold the fire in check o stop the fire spreading;

consiguieron detener la hemorragia they managed to stop the bleeding;

estaba decidido, nada podía detenerlo he had made up his mind, nothing could stop him;

¡adelante, hazlo! ¿qué te detiene? go on, do it! what's stopping you?

2. [arrestar] to arrest

3. [entretener] to keep, to delay;

¿qué fue lo que te detuvo? what kept you?, what held you up?

♦ See also the pronominal verb detenerse

* * *

1 stop

2 de policía arrest, detain

* * *

detener {80} vt

1) arrestar: to arrest, to detain

2) parar: to stop, to halt

3) : to keep, to hold back

♦ See also the reflexive verb detenerse

* * *

detener vb

1. (parar) to stop [pt. & pp. stopped]

2. (arrestar) to arrest

- niewyczerpane zasoby węgla/ropy naftowej endless a. inexhaustible resources of coal/crude oil

- rzeka stanowi niewyczerpane źródło wody the river is an endless a. inexhaustible water source

- być niewyczerpanym w pomysłach to be an inexhaustible a. unwearying source of ideas

- mieć do wszystkich niewyczerpaną cierpliwość to have inexhaustible a. unwearying patience for everyone

- mieć niewyczerpane siły twórcze to have inexhaustible creative powers

- umysł o niewyczerpanych możliwościach a mind of inexhaustible possibilities

   1) All Human Complex Problem Solving Is Creativity

   Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Models of Creative Association

   Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)

   3) Creative Innovation and Social Independence

   There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)

   4) Ego Strength and Emotional Stability among Creative Geniuses

   he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)

   5) Its Mundane Character

   he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)

   6) Mozart's Musical Ideas Came to Him in Polished Form

   From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)

   7) Scientific Theories and Works of Art Alike Originate in Fantasy

   Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)

   8) Self- Esteem and Creative Expression

   The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)

   9) Stages in Creative Problem- Solving

   In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)

    10) The Bisociative Pattern of the Creative Synthesis

   he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)

    11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with Disorder

   Even to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)

    12) The Inner Life of the Creative Process

   New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)

    13) The Problem of What Impels the Creative Person

   [P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....

   Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)

    14) Theories of Creative Thinking

   A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....

   Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)

1. strength, force

(мощ) power, might

(степен на сила) intensity, vehemence, violence

(енергия) energy, vigour, stamina

(насилие) force, violence

сила на вятъра strength of the wind

сила на светлината/на електрически ток intensity of light/of an electric current

сила на притеглянето физ. attraction

сила на сцеплението физ. cohesion

сила на съпротивлението физ. resistance

сила на тежестта физ. gravity

гравитационна сила attraction of gravity

сила на глас carrying power of a voice

сила на звук volume/intensity of a sound

сила на удар shock of a blow

сила на експлозия force/shock of an explosion

сила на мускулите muscular strength

сила на болест virulence of a disease

силата на слънцето the power of the sun

физическа сила physical force, bodily strength

конска сила horse power (съкр. h. p.)

двигателна/електродвижеща/ударна сила rootive/electromotive/striking power

силата на младостта the vigour of youth

сила на волята will-power, strength of will

сила на духа strength of mind, fortitude

силата на паметта the tenacity of memory

силата на примера the power of example

жизнена сила vigour, vitality

вътрешна сила inner power

вътрешни сили internal resources

скрита сила hidden strength

скрити сили hidden forces, latent powers

груба сила brute force

употреба на сила use of force

със сила by main force, ( насилствено) forcibly, through violence

с все/всичка сила, с всички сили violently; with all o.'s might, with might and main; for all one is worth

разг. with tooth and nail

(за звук) full blast

викам с все сила cry at the top of o.'s voice

политика от позиция на сила a-position-of-strength policy

послужвам си със сила use force, take violent action

давам сила на lend force/strength to

защитни сили на организма staying powers, forces/powers of resistance

творчески сили creative powers

тъмни сили dark/sinister forces

със собствени сили by o.'s own efforts

според силите си, доколкото ми стигат силите as much as one is able, according to o.'s powers, to the best of o.'s power/ability, to the utmost of o.'s capacity; as far as o.'s powers go, to the extent of o.'s powers

правя всичко, което ми е по силите do everything within o.'s power

напълно по силите на well within the reach of

не но силите на beyond the powers of; too much for

това не ми е по силите I am not equal to/not up to this, it is beyond my powers, it is too much for me

разг. this beats me

(не съм компетентен) it is beyond my reach/scope

нямам вече сили, не са ми оставали сили, на края на силите си съм have no strength left, разг. be at the end of o.'s tether

нямам сили да be too weak to

не ми останаха сили разг. I am quite knocked up

губя сили lose strength, grow weaker, break up

силите ми ме напускат my strength is failing me/is giving way

намирам сили в себе си find the strength, find enough strength in o.s., trust o.s., have it in one, find it in one (да to)

не мога да намеря сили да I can't bring myself to

напрягам всички сили strain every muscle

хабя силите си spend/waste o.'s strength, dissipate o.'s energy/energies

поглъщам всичките сили на някого absorb all o.'s energies

изчерпвам силите на exhaust the power/strength of

възстановявам силите си restore o.'s forces/energies, recover o.'s strength

събирам сили work up/gather/muster strength

пазя силите си keep o.'s strength

пестя силите си save o.'s energies

черпя сили от draw o.'s strength from

с последни сили by a last effort

напрягам силите си, работя свръх силите си strain o.s

* * *

сѝла,

ж., -и 1. strength, force; forcefulness; ( мощ) power, might; ( степен на сила) intensity, vehemence, violence; ( енергия) energy, vigour, stamina; ( насилие) force, violence; бягам/тътря с все \силаа run/set off at full pelt; викам с все \силаа cry at the top of o.’s voice; възстановявам \силаите си restore o.’s forces/energies, recover o.’s strength; вътрешни \силаи internal resources; гравитационна \силаа физ. attraction of gravity; груба \силаа brute force; губя \силаи lose strength, grow weaker, break up; двигателна/електродвижеща/ударна \силаа motive/electromotive/striking power; жизнена \силаа vigour, vitality; защитни \силаи на организма staying power, forces/powers of resistance; изчерпвам \силаите на exhaust the power/strength of; конска \силаа horse power, съкр. h.p.; намирам \силаи в себе си find the strength, find enough strength in o.s., trust o.s., have it in one, find it in one (да to); напрягам всички \силаи да strain every muscle; напрягам \силаите си, работя свръх \силаите си strain o.s. (to the utmost), overtax o.s.; напълно по \силаите на well within the reach of; не ми останаха \силаи разг. I am quite knocked up; не мога да намеря \силаи да I can’t bring myself to; нямам \силаи да be too weak to; пазя \силаите си keep o.’s strength; пестя \силаите си save o.’s energies; политика от позиция на \силаата a-position-of-strength policy; правя всичко, което е по \силаите ми do everything within o.’s power; с все/всичка \силаа, с всички \силаи violently; with all o.’s might, with might and main; for all one is worth; разг. with tooth and nail, flat out; (за звук) full blast; с последни \силаи by a last effort; \силаа на болест virulence of a disease; \силаа на волята will-power, strength of will; \силаа на вятъра strength of the wind; \силаа на глас carrying power of a voice; \силаа на духа strength of mind, fortitude; \силаа на експлозия force/shock of an explosion; \силаа на звук volume/intensity of a sound; \силаа на мускулите muscular strength; \силаа на притеглянето физ. attraction; \силаа на светлината/на електрическия ток intensity of light/of an electric current; \силаа на сцеплението физ. cohesion; \силаа на съпротивлението физ. resistance; \силаа на тежестта физ. gravity; \силаа на удар shock of a blow; \силаата на паметта the tenacity of memory; \силаата на слънцето the power of the sun; \силаите ми ме напускат my strength is failing me/is giving way; скрити \силаи hidden forces, latent powers; според \силаите си, доколкото ми стигат \силаите as much as one is able, according to o.’s powers, to the best of o.’s power/ability, to the utmost of o.’s capacity; as far as o.’s powers go, to the extent of o.’s power; събирам \силаи work up/gather/muster strength; със \силаа by main force, ( насилствено) forcibly, through violence; със собствени \силаи by o.’s own efforts; това не ми е по \силаите I am not equal to/not up to this, it is beyond my powers, it is too much for me; разг. this beats me; I can’t hack this; (не съм компетентен) it is beyond my reach/scope; тъмни \силаи dark/sinister forces; употреба на \силаа use of force; физическа \силаа physical force, bodily strength; разг. beef; elbow-grease; хабя \силаите си spend/waste o.’s strength, dissipate o.’s energy/energies; черпя \силаи от draw o.’s strength from;

2. юр. effect; force; validity; в \силаа съм (за закон и пр.) hold; be valid; be in force; влизам в \силаа come into force/effect, become effective/operative, take effect; законът е в \силаа от днес the law is effective from today; заповедта е в \силаа the order stands; нямам законна \силаа be null and void; оставам в \силаа remain valid, continue in force; по \силаата на закона on the strength of the law, under the law; по \силаата на съдебно решение/споразумение under a court order/an agreement; със законна \силаа legally binding;

3. ( изтъкнат деец, талант) talent; млади \силаи young/new talent, young energies, new blood;

4. само мн. ( група с влияние) forces; враждебни \силаи hostile powers; разпределение на \силаи alignment of forces; революционни/демократически \силаи revolutionary/democratic forces;

5. само мн. воен. forces; военновъздушни \силаи air-force, ( английски) Royal Air Force, съкр. RAF; въоръжени \силаи armed forces; главните \силаи the main body; морски/сухопътни \силаи naval/land forces; превъзхождащи \силаи superior force(s); сухопътни, морски и въздушни \силаи the fighting forces; съсредоточаване на \силаи build-up; • в \силаата си at o.’s height, (за човек и пр.) in o.’s prime; Великите \силаи истор., полит. the great powers; договарящи се \силаи contracting powers; по \силаата на by/in virtue of, on the strength of; по \силаата на обстоятелствата owing to the force of circumstances, by force of circumstances; по \силаата на това on that ground; according; by implication; производителни \силаи productive forces; работна \силаа икон. labour.

* * *

force: use сила against - използвам сила срещу, democratic силаs - демократични сили, air-сила - военновъздушни сили; strength: He found the сила to overcome the pain. - Той намери сили да преодолее болката., You need a vacation to recover your сила. - Трябва да отидеш на почивка, за да възстановиш силите си., draw сила from - черпя сили от; power: horse сила - конска сила, She obtains inner сила.- Тя притежава вътрешна сила., staying силаs - защитни сили, electric сила - електрическа сила; might (мощ); (степен на сила): intensity; violence; vehemence; manitou (природна); acuteness; effect (юр.); energy: He works with inexhaustible сила. - Той работи с неизчерпаема сила.; impetus; medium; mightiness; muscle (мускулна); pith; potency; stringency (на довод); verve; vigour; vim (разг.); virility; virtue: by сила of the circumstances - по силата на обстоятелствата; volume (на звук)

* * *

   1) A Comparison of the Digital Computer and the Brain

   The brain has been compared to a digital computer because the neuron, like a switch or valve, either does or does not complete a circuit. But at that point the similarity ends. The switch in the digital computer is constant in its effect, and its effect is large in proportion to the total output of the machine. The effect produced by the neuron varies with its recovery from [the] refractory phase and with its metabolic state. The number of neurons involved in any action runs into millions so that the influence of any one is negligible.... Any cell in the system can be dispensed with.... The brain is an analogical machine, not digital. Analysis of the integrative activities will probably have to be in statistical terms. (Lashley, quoted in Beach, Hebb, Morgan & Nissen, 1960, p. 539)

   2) Computers Do Not Crunch Numbers, They Manipulate Symbols

   It is essential to realize that a computer is not a mere "number cruncher," or supercalculating arithmetic machine, although this is how computers are commonly regarded by people having no familiarity with artificial intelligence. Computers do not crunch numbers; they manipulate symbols.... Digital computers originally developed with mathematical problems in mind, are in fact general purpose symbol manipulating machines....

   The terms "computer" and "computation" are themselves unfortunate, in view of their misleading arithmetical connotations. The definition of artificial intelligence previously cited-"the study of intelligence as computation"-does not imply that intelligence is really counting. Intelligence may be defined as the ability creatively to manipulate symbols, or process information, given the requirements of the task in hand. (Boden, 1981, pp. 15, 16-17)

   3) Getting Computers to Explain Things to Themselves

   The task is to get computers to explain things to themselves, to ask questions about their experiences so as to cause those explanations to be forthcoming, and to be creative in coming up with explanations that have not been previously available. (Schank, 1986, p. 19)

   4) Some Limits of Artificial Intelligence

   In What Computers Can't Do, written in 1969 (2nd edition, 1972), the main objection to AI was the impossibility of using rules to select only those facts about the real world that were relevant in a given situation. The "Introduction" to the paperback edition of the book, published by Harper & Row in 1979, pointed out further that no one had the slightest idea how to represent the common sense understanding possessed even by a four-year-old. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 102)

   5) The Computer as a Humanizing Influence

   A popular myth says that the invention of the computer diminishes our sense of ourselves, because it shows that rational thought is not special to human beings, but can be carried on by a mere machine. It is a short stop from there to the conclusion that intelligence is mechanical, which many people find to be an affront to all that is most precious and singular about their humanness.

   In fact, the computer, early in its career, was not an instrument of the philistines, but a humanizing influence. It helped to revive an idea that had fallen into disrepute: the idea that the mind is real, that it has an inner structure and a complex organization, and can be understood in scientific terms. For some three decades, until the 1940s, American psychology had lain in the grip of the ice age of behaviorism, which was antimental through and through. During these years, extreme behaviorists banished the study of thought from their agenda. Mind and consciousness, thinking, imagining, planning, solving problems, were dismissed as worthless for anything except speculation. Only the external aspects of behavior, the surface manifestations, were grist for the scientist's mill, because only they could be observed and measured....

   It is one of the surprising gifts of the computer in the history of ideas that it played a part in giving back to psychology what it had lost, which was nothing less than the mind itself. In particular, there was a revival of interest in how the mind represents the world internally to itself, by means of knowledge structures such as ideas, symbols, images, and inner narratives, all of which had been consigned to the realm of mysticism. (Campbell, 1989, p. 10)

   6) The Intentionality of Computers Is Essentially Borrowed, Hence Derivative

   [Our artifacts] only have meaning because we give it to them; their intentionality, like that of smoke signals and writing, is essentially borrowed, hence derivative. To put it bluntly: computers themselves don't mean anything by their tokens (any more than books do)-they only mean what we say they do. Genuine understanding, on the other hand, is intentional "in its own right" and not derivatively from something else. (Haugeland, 1981a, pp. 32-33)

   7) The Possibility of Computer Thought

   he debate over the possibility of computer thought will never be won or lost; it will simply cease to be of interest, like the previous debate over man as a clockwork mechanism. (Bolter, 1984, p. 190)

   8) We Are Getting Better at Building Even Better Computers, an Ever- Escalating Upward Spiral

   t takes us a long time to emotionally digest a new idea. The computer is too big a step, and too recently made, for us to quickly recover our balance and gauge its potential. It's an enormous accelerator, perhaps the greatest one since the plow, twelve thousand years ago. As an intelligence amplifier, it speeds up everything-including itself-and it continually improves because its heart is information or, more plainly, ideas. We can no more calculate its consequences than Babbage could have foreseen antibiotics, the Pill, or space stations.

   According to weak AI, the principle value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion than before. But according to strong AI the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states. And according to strong AI, because the programmed computer has cognitive states, the programs are not mere tools that enable us to test psychological explanations; rather, the programs are themselves the explanations. (Searle, 1981b, p. 353)

    10) Why People Are Smarter Than Computers

   What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not quicker or more precise. Yet people are far better at perceiving objects in natural scenes and noting their relations, at understanding language and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other natural cognitive tasks. People are also far better at learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience.

   What is the basis for these differences? One answer, perhaps the classic one we might expect from artificial intelligence, is "software." If we only had the right computer program, the argument goes, we might be able to capture the fluidity and adaptability of human information processing. Certainly this answer is partially correct. There have been great breakthroughs in our understanding of cognition as a result of the development of expressive high-level computer languages and powerful algorithms. However, we do not think that software is the whole story.

   In our view, people are smarter than today's computers because the brain employs a basic computational architecture that is more suited to deal with a central aspect of the natural information processing tasks that people are so good at.... hese tasks generally require the simultaneous consideration of many pieces of information or constraints. Each constraint may be imperfectly specified and ambiguous, yet each can play a potentially decisive role in determining the outcome of processing. (McClelland, Rumelhart & Hinton, 1986, pp. 3-4)

- umysł ścisły pot. scientific mind

- nie powinien studiować nauk humanistycznych, to ścisły umysł he shouldn’t go into humanities, he’s got a scientific mind

- jasny/bystry/twórczy/chłonny/płytki umysł a clear/sharp/creative/receptive/shallow mind

- mieć logiczny/analityczny umysł to have a logical/an analytical mind

- tego się nie da ogarnąć umysłem that is incomprehensible

- mieć umysł zaprzątnięty różnymi sprawami pot. to have different things on one’s mind

- nie rozumiem, jak ona może zaprzątać sobie umysł takimi głupstwami I don’t understand how she can fill her mind with such rubbish

- ten profesor to najwybitniejszy umysł, jaki miałem okazję spotkać this professor is the greatest mind a. brain I’ve ever come across

■ być zdrowym na umyśle to be in one’s right mind a. in one’s senses, to be of sound mind

- słaby na umyśle euf. mentally challenged, feeble-minded

- umysł mu się pomieszał przest. he’s gone out of his mind, his mind is going

1 peak, acme, climax, top.

2 cusp, pointed tooth tip.

* * *

► nombre femenino

1 (cumbre) summit, peak

2 (en geometría) apex

3 figurado peak

* * *

* * *

1) (Anat) cusp

2) (Geog) summit, peak; (fig) pinnacle, apex

3) (Mat) apex

* * *

a) ( de montaña) top, summit; ( de pirámide) top, apex

b) (de fama, poder) height, pinnacle

c) ( de organización) leadership

* * *

= peak, pinnacle, cusp, peak, crest.

Ex. Make a note of the story's climax in your mind, so that you can indicate to the children by pause, by quickening of the pace, the peak of the tale.

Ex. There are, it is assumed, 'high' and 'low' forms of culture, especially in the field of the creative arts which are conceived of as somehow the pinnacle and foremost end of human life.

Ex. Although this approach worked well for the very young and the very old, patrons on the cusp of these age groupings may have been misclassified.

Ex. Rob's death came as he neared the culmination of a personal quest to climb the highest peaks on each of the seven continents.

Ex. In the crest of the timeworn Black Mountains lies the summit of Mount Mitchell, the highest point east of the Mississippi.

----

* alcanzar la cúspide de = reach + the pinnacle of, reach + the height of.

* en la cúspide = at the top of the tree.

* * *

a) ( de montaña) top, summit; ( de pirámide) top, apex

b) (de fama, poder) height, pinnacle

c) ( de organización) leadership

* * *

* * *

1 (de una montaña) top, summit; (de una pirámide) top, apex

2 (apogeo) height, pinnacle

alcanzar la cúspide de la fama/del poder to reach the height o pinnacle of one's fame/power

3 (de una organización) leadership

* * *

a) ( de montaña) top, summit;

b) (de fama, poder) height, pinnacle

c) ( de organización) leadership

* * *

cúspide nf

1. [de montaña] summit, top

2. [de torre] top

3. [de organización] leadership

4. [apogeo] peak, height;

en la cúspide de su carrera at the peak of her career

5. Geom apex

* * *

f de montaña summit; de fama etc height

* * *

cúspide nf

: zenith, apex, peak

λόγος, ου, ὁ (verbal noun of λέγω in the sense ‘pick’; Hom.+).

① a communication whereby the mind finds expression, word

ⓐ of utterance, chiefly oral.

α. as expression, word (oratorical ability plus exceptional performance were distinguishing marks in Hellenic society, hence the frequent association of λ. and ἔργον ‘deed’; a sim. formulation as early as Il. 9, 443 μύθων τε ῥητῆρʼ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων; Polystrat. p. 33 μὴ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλʼ ἔργω; Just., A II, 4, 2 ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ and D. 35, 7 λόγον ἢ πρᾶξιν) δυνατὸς ἐν ἔργῳ κ. λόγῳ, i.e. an exceptional personage Lk 24:19; pl. of Moses Ac 7:22 (the contrast expressed w. a verb Choix 20, 6–8 ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν ὄτι δύναται καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ of Apollordorus, a benefactor in Cyzicus, a flourishing city in Phrygia; sim. New Docs 7, 233, no. 10, 8f πολιτευόμενος … λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ; cp. IKourion 32, 8; without contrast Diod S 13, 101, 3 ἄνδρας λόγῳ δυνατούς; for sim. constructions using λέγω and πράσσω s. Danker, Benefactor 339–43). Cp. Ro 15:18; 2 Cor 10:11; Col 3:17; 2 Th 2:17; Hb 13:21 v.l.; 1J 3:18 (cp. Theognis 1, 87f Diehl³ μή μʼ ἔπεσιν μὲν στέργε κτλ.—For the contrast λόγῳ … ἀληθείᾳ cp. Diod S 13, 4, 1). In contrast to a sinful deed we also have the λόγος ἁμαρτίας sinful word Judaicon 172, 9. W. γνῶσις: ἐν παντὶ λόγῳ κ. πάσῃ γνώσει 1 Cor 1:5. ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῇ γνώσει 2 Cor 11:6. (Opp. δύναμις ‘revelation of power’) 1 Cor 4:19, 20. τὸ εὐαγγέλιον οὐκ ἐγενήθη ἐν λόγῳ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει 1 Th 1:5 (cp. Ar. 13, 7 of mythical accounts οὐδέν εἰσιν εἰ μὴ μόνον λόγοι ‘they’re nothing but words’). W. ἐπιστολή: 2 Th 2:2, 15. W. ἀναστροφή: 1 Ti 4:12; 1 Pt 3:1b. Opp. ‘be silent’: IRo 2:1.—μόνον εἰπὲ λόγῳ just say the word Mt 8:8; cp. Lk 7:7 (Ath. 17, 1 ὡς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν; 29, 2; Phalaris, Ep. 121, 1 λόγῳ λέγειν; cp. schol. on Pla. 341a ἐν λόγῳ μόνον εἰπεῖν). οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο ἀποκριθῆναι αὐτῷ λόγον no one was able to answer him a (single) word Mt 22:46; cp. 15:23 (cp. TestAbr A 16 p. 98, 11 [Stone p. 44] οὐκ ἀπεκρίθη αὐτῷ λόγον).— The (mighty) word (of one who performs miracles) ἐξέβαλεν τὰ πνεύματα λόγῳ Mt 8:16 (a rare use of λ. as ‘single utterance’, s. L-S-J-M s.v. VII).—διὰ λόγου by word of mouth (opp. ‘by letter’) Ac 15:27.—In the textually uncertain pass. Ac 20:24 the text as it stands in N., οὐδενὸς λόγου (v.l. λόγον) ποιοῦμαι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμίαν, may well mean: I do not consider my life worth a single word (cp. λόγου ἄξιον [ἄξιος 1a] and our ‘worth mention’; s. Conzelmann ad loc.).

β. The expression may take on a variety of formulations or topical nuances: what you say Mt 5:37; statement (PGM 4, 334) Lk 20:20; question (Sext. Emp., Math. 8, 295; 9, 133; Diog. L. 2, 116) ἐρωτήσω ὑμᾶς λόγον I will ask you a question (cp. TestJob 36:5; GrBar 5:1; ApcSed 13:6; Jos., Ant. 12, 99) Mt 21:24; cp. Mk 11:29; Lk 20:3; prayer (PGM 1, 25; 4, 90; 179; 230 al.; 5, 180; 196 al.) Mt 26:44; Mk 14:39. ἡγούμενος τοῦ λ. principal speaker Ac 14:12. W. epexeget. gen. λ. παρακλήσεως 13:15. W. κήρυγμα our manner of presentation and our proclamation 1 Cor 2:4a (but s. comm.). (W. διδασκαλία) preaching 1 Ti 5:17; prophecy (Biogr. p. 364 [Pythia]) J 2:22; 18:32. Command (Aeschyl., Pers. 363) Lk 4:36; 2 Pt 3:5, 7; via a letter 2 Th 3:14. Report, story (X., An. 1, 4, 7; Diod S 3, 40, 9; 19, 110, 1 λ. διαδιδόναι=spread a report; Appian, Iber. 80 §346, Maced. 4 §1 [both=rumor]; Diod S 32, 15, 3 ἦλθεν ὁ λ. ἐπί τινα=the report came to someone; Arrian, Anab. 7, 22, 1 λόγος λέγεται τοιόσδε=a story is told like this, Ind. 9, 2; Diod S 3, 18, 3 λ.=story, account; Jos., Ant. 19, 132; Tat. 27, 2 τοῦ καθʼ Ἡρακλέα λόγου) Mt 28:15; Mk 1:45; Lk 5:15 (λ. περί τινος as X., An. 6, 6, 13; Jos., Ant. 19, 127) 7:17; J 21:23. ἠκούσθη ὁ λόγος εἰς τὰ ὦτα τ. ἐκκλησίας the report came to the ears of the assembly in Jerusalem Ac 11:22. λόγον ἔχειν σοφίας have the appearance of wisdom, pass for wisdom Col 2:23 (cp. Pla., Epinomis 987b ἔχει λόγον; Demosth., C. Lept. 462 [20, 18] λόγον τινʼ ἔχον; but mng. 2f is possible). Proverb (Pla., Phdr. 17, 240c, Symp. 18, 195b, Gorg. 54, 499c, Leg. 6, 5, 757a; Socrat., Ep. 22, 1) J 4:37 (Ps.-Callisth. 1, 13, 7 ἀληθῶς ἐν τούτῳ ὁ λ. foll. by a proverb). Proclamation, instruction, teaching, message Lk 4:32; 10:39; J 4:41; 17:20; Ac 2:41; 4:4; 10:44; 20:7; 1 Cor 1:17; 2:1. In Ac18:15 ζητήματα περὶ λόγου καὶ ὀνομάτων καὶ νόμου the sense appears to be someth. like this: controversial issues involving disputes about words and your way of life with λ. prob. referring to the presentation of controversial subjects, which in turn arouses heated ζητήματα debates. λόγος σοφίας proclamation of wisdom, speaking wisely 1 Cor 12:8a (Ps.-Phoc. 129 τῆς θεοπνεύστου σοφίης λ.); corresp. λ. γνώσεως vs. 8b. Cp. 14:9; 15:2; 2 Cor 1:18; 6:7; 10:10. λ. μαρτυρίας word of witness Rv 12:11. ὁ κατὰ τ. διδαχὴν πιστὸς λ. the message of faith, corresponding to the teaching Tit 1:9; the opp. 2 Ti 2:17. A speech (Aristot. p. 14b, 2; Diod S 40, 5a) διὰ λόγου πολλοῦ in a long speech Ac 15:32; cp. 20:2. λ. κολακείας flattering speech 1 Th 2:5. Speaking gener. 2 Cor 8:7; Eph 6:19; Col 4:6; D 2:5. ἐν λόγῳ πταίειν make a mistake in what one says Js 3:2.—Of God’s word, command, commission (LXX; ParJer 5:19 κατηχῆσαι αὐτοὺς τὸν λόγον; SyrBar 13:2; ApcSed 14:10; Just., D. 84, 2; Ael. Aristid. hears a ἱερὸς λ. at night fr. a god: 28, 116 K.=49, p. 529 D.; Sextus 24) ἠκυρώσατε τ. λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ Mt 15:6 (v.l. νόμον, ἐντολήν); cp. Mk 7:13.—J 5:38; 8:55; 10:35; Ro 3:4 (Ps 50:6). Of God’s promise Ro 9:6, 9 (but these two vss., and Gal 5:14 below, prob. fit better under 2a), 28 (Is 10:22f). Cp. Hb 2:2; 4:2 (s. ἀκοή 4b); 7:28; 12:19. For B 15:1 see 1aδ. The whole law (as the expr. εἴ τι ἑτέρα ἐντολή indicates not limited to a narrow list of commandments), acc. to Ro 13:9. In what is prob. a play on words (s. 2a and b), Gal 5:14 (s. 2a below) is summed up in the λόγος as expressed in Lev 19:18.—That which God has created ἁγιάζεται διὰ λόγου θεοῦ 1 Ti 4:5; in line w. the context, this hardly refers to God’s creative word (so SibOr 3, 20; PtK 2; πάντα γὰρ λόγῳ ποιήσας ὁ θεός Theoph. Ant. 2, 18 [144, 8]), but to table prayers which use biblical expressions. The divine word as judge of thoughts Hb 4:12. τελεσθήσονται οἱ λ. τοῦ θεοῦ Ac 17:17; cp. 19:9.—Of the divine revelation through Christ and his messengers (Just., A I, 61, 9 λόγον … παρὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἐμάθομεν τοῦτον) θεὸς ἐφανέρωσεν τὸν λ. αὐτοῦ ἐν κηρύγματι Tit 1:3. δέδωκα αὐτοῖς τὸν λ. σου J 17:14; cp. vss. 6, 17; 1J 1:10; 2:14. ἵνα μὴ ὁ λ. τοῦ θεοῦ βλασφημῆται Tit 2:5. The apostles and other preachers, w. ref. to the λόγος of God, are said to: λαλεῖν Ac 4:29, 31; 13:46; Phil 1:14; Hb 13:7; καταγγέλλειν Ac 13:5; 17:13; διδάσκειν 18:11; μαρτυρεῖν Rv 1:2. Of their hearers it is said: τὸν λ. τοῦ θεοῦ ἀκούειν Ac 13:7; δέχεσθαι 8:14; 11:1. Of the λ. τοῦ θεοῦ itself we read: ηὔξανεν Ac 6:7; 12:24; 19:20; οὐ δέδεται 2 Ti 2:9. In these places and many others ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ is simply the Christian message, the gospel: Lk 5:1; 8:11, 21; 11:28 (Simplicius in Epict. p. 1, 20 μὴ μόνον ἀκουόντων ἀλλὰ πασχόντων καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων=let the message have its effect on oneself); Ac 6:2 (s. καταλείπω 7c; for prob. commercial metaph. s. 2a below); 13:44 v.l. (for κυρίου); 16:32 v.l.; 1 Cor 14:36; 2 Cor 2:17; 4:2; Col 1:25; 1 Pt 1:23; Rv 1:9; 6:9; 20:4; IPhld 11:1. Cp. 1 Th 2:13ab; 1J 2:5.—Since this ‘divine word’ is brought to humanity through Christ, his word can be used in the same sense: ὁ λόγος μου J 5:24; cp. 8:31, 37, 43, 51f; 12:48; 14:23f; 15:3, 20b; Rv 3:8. ὁ λόγος τοῦ Χριστοῦ Col 3:16; cp. Hb 6:1. ὁ λ. τοῦ κυρίου Ac 8:25; 12:24 v.l.; 13:44, 48f; 14:25 v.l.; 15:35, 36; 16:32 (cp. λ. θεοῦ); 19:10; 1 Th 1:8; 2 Th 3:1. Pl. Mk 8:38 (Lk 9:26); 1 Ti 6:3; cp. Lk 24:44; s. also 1aδ.—Or it is called simply ὁ λόγος=the ‘Word’, for no misunderstanding would be possible among Christians: Mt 13:20–23; Mk 2:2; 4:14–20, 33; 8:32 (s. 1aε below); 16:20; Lk 1:2; 8:12f, 15; Ac 6:4; 8:4; 10:36 (on the syntax s. FNeirynck, ETL 60, ’84, 118–23); 11:19; 14:25 (cp. λ. κυρίου above); 16:6; 17:11; 18:5; Gal 6:6; Phil 1:14; Col 4:3; 1 Th 1:6; 2 Ti 4:2; Js 1:21ff; 1 Pt 2:8; 3:1; 1J 2:7; AcPl Ha 7, 6 (so also Mel., HE 4, 26, 13; Ath. 2, 3).—Somet. the ‘Word’ is more closely defined by a gen.: ὁ λ. τῆς βασιλείας the word of the reign/rule (of God) Mt 13:19. τῆς σωτηρίας Ac 13:26. τῆς καταλλαγῆς 2 Cor 5:19. τοῦ σταυροῦ 1 Cor 1:18. δικαιοσύνης (q.v. 3a) Hb 5:13. ζωῆς Phil 2:16. (τῆς) ἀληθείας (Theoph. Ant. 3, 4 [p. 212, 2]; cp. περὶ ἀληθείας Hippol., Ref. 10, 6, 1) Eph 1:13; Col 1:5; 2 Ti 2:15; Js 1:18; AcPl Ha 8, 8 (Just., D. 121, 2). τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ (=τοῦ κυρίου) Ac 14:3; 20:32. (Differently the pl. οἱ λόγοι τ. χάριτος gracious words Lk 4:22; cp. Marcellinus, Vi. Thu. 57 Hude λόγοι εἰρωνείας.) ὁ λ. τοῦ εὐαγγελίου Ac 15:7; ὁ τοῦ Χριστιανισμοῦ λ. MPol 10:1. In Rv 3:10 the gospel is described by the ‘One who has the key of David’ as ὁ λ. τῆς ὑπομονῆς μου my word of endurance (W-S. §30, 12c). λ. τῶν ὑ[πο]μονῶν AcPl Ha 6, 11. παρελάβετε τὸν λ. ὅτι AcPl Ha 8, 25.—The pastoral letters favor the expr. πιστὸς ὁ λόγος (sc. ἐστίν, and s. πιστός 1b) 1 Ti 1:15; 3:1; 4:9; 2 Ti 2:11; Tit 3:8; cp. Rv 21:5; 22:6. λ. ὑγιής sound preaching Tit 2:8; cp. the pl. ὑγιαίνοντες λόγοι 2 Ti 1:13 (on medicinal use of words for the mind or soul s. VLeinieks, The City of Dionysos ’96, 115–22, on Eur.).—The pl. is also used gener. of Christian teachings, the words of the gospel Lk 1:4 (s. κατηχέω 2a); 1 Th 4:18. οἱ λ. τῆς πίστεως 1 Ti 4:6. On λόγοι κυριακοί for λόγια κυριακά in the title of the Papias document s. ἐξήγησις 2.—JSchniewind, Die Begriffe Wort und Evangelium bei Pls, diss. Bonn 1910; RAsting (εὐαγγέλιον, end).

γ. of an individual declaration or remark: assertion, declaration, speech ἀκούσαντες τὸν λ. when they heard the statement Mt 15:12; cp. 19:11, 22; 22:15; Mk 5:36. διὰ τοῦτον τὸν λ. because of this statement of yours 7:29 (TestAbr A 15 p. 95, 29 [Stone p. 38] τὸν λ. τοῦτον; ApcMos 25 εἰς τὸν λόγον σου κρινῶ σε). Cp. 10:22; 12:13; Lk 1:29; 22:61 v.l. (for ῥήματος); J 4:39, 50; 6:60; 7:36, 40 v.l.; 15:20a; 18:9; 19:8; Ac 6:5; 7:29; 20:38; 22:22; 1 Th 4:15. ὸ̔ς ἐὰν εἴπῃ λόγον κατὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου whoever utters a (defamatory) word against the Son of Humanity Mt 12:32 (λ. εἰπεῖν κατά τινος as Jos., Ant. 15, 81); cp. Lk 12:10. λόγος σαπρός unwholesome talk Eph 4:29. λόγον ποιεῖσθαι make a speech Ac 11:2 D (cp. Hyperid. 3, 20; Jos., Ant. 11, 86).

δ. the pl. (οἱ) λόγοι is used, on the one hand, of words uttered on various occasions, of speeches or instruction given here and there by humans or transcendent beings (TestAbr A 14 p. 94, 19 [Stone p. 36]; Jos., Ant. 4, 264; Just., D. 100, 3) ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου δικαιωθήσῃ (καταδικασθήσῃ) Mt 12:37ab; 24:35; Mk 13:31; Lk 21:33; Ac 2:40; 7:22 (ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἔργοις αὐτοῦ. On the word-deed pair cp. Dio Chrys. 4, 6 the λόγοι and ἔργα of Diogenes; s. α above). οἱ δέκα λόγοι the ten commandments (Ex 34:28; Dt 10:4; Philo, Rer. Div. Her. 168, Decal. 32; Jos., Ant. 3, 138; cp. 91f; Did., Gen. 36, 10) B 15:1. Ac 15:24; 20:35; 1 Cor 2:4b, 13; 14:19ab; κενοὶ λ. Eph 5:6; AcPl Ox 6, 13 (cp. Aa 1, 241, 14); Dg 8:2; πλαστοὶ λ. 2 Pt 2:3. λ. πονηροί 3J 10.—Also of words and exprs. that form a unity, whether it be connected discourse (Jos., Ant. 15, 126; Just., A II, 12, 6, D. 11, 5; 81, 3 al.), a conversation, or parts of one and the same teaching, or expositions on the same subject (Diod S 16, 2, 3 μετέσχε τῶν Πυθαγορίων λόγων; Dio Chrys. 37 [54], 1; Ael. Aristid. 50, 55 K.=26 p. 519 D.: οἱ Πλάτωνος λόγοι; PsSol 17:43 [words of the Messiah]; AscIs 3:12 οἱ λόγοι τοῦ Βελχειρά) πᾶς ὅστις ἀκούει μου τοὺς λόγους τούτους Mt 7:24; cp. vss. 26, 28; 10:14; 19:1; 26:1; Mk 10:24; Lk 1:20; 6:47; 9:28, 44. ἐπηρώτα αὐτὸν ἐν λόγοις ἱκανοῖς he questioned him at some length 23:9. τίνες οἱ λ. οὗτοι οὓς ἀντιβάλλετε; what is this conversation that you are holding? 24:17; J 7:40 (s. γ); 10:19; J 14:24a; 19:13; Ac 2:22; 5:5, 24; 16:36; 2 Ti 4:15; 1 Cl 13:1; 46:7. λόγοις φθοριμαίοις AcPlCor 1:2.

ε. the subject under discussion, matter, thing gener. (Theognis 1055 Diehl; Hdt. 8, 65 μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον εἴπῃς. Cp. Hebr. דָּבָר) τὸν λ. ἐκράτησαν they took up the subject Mk 9:10; cp. Mt. 21:24 (s. 1aβ beg.). οὐκ ἔστιν σοι μερὶς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ you have no share in this matter Ac 8:21. ἰδεῖν περὶ τ. λόγου τούτου look into this matter 15:6. ἔχειν πρός τινα λόγον have a complaint against someone (cp. Demosth. 35, 55 ἐμοὶ πρὸς τούτους ὁ λόγος; PIand 16, 3 δίκαιον λόγον ἔχει πρὸς σέ) 19:38. παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας Mt 5:32; 19:9 v.l. (2d is also prob.).—Perh. also Mk 8:32 he discussed the subject quite freely (but s. 1aβ above).

ⓑ of literary or oratorical productions: of the separate books of a work (Hdt. 5, 36 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τ. λόγων; Pla., Parmen. 2, 127d ὁ πρῶτος λόγος; Philo, Omn. Prob. Lib. 1 ὁ μὲν πρότερος λόγος ἦν ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεόδοτε, περὶ τοῦ …) treatise Ac 1:1 (s. on the prologue to Ac: AHilgenfeld, ZWT 41, 1898, 619ff; AGercke, Her 29, 1894, 373ff; RLaqueur, Her 46, 1911, 161ff; Norden, Agn. Th. 311ff; JCreed, JTS 35, ’34, 176–82; Goodsp., Probs. 119–21). Παπίας … πέντε λόγους κυριακῶν λογίων ἔγραψεν Papias (11:1; cp. 3:1 e; 11:2; 12:2).—περὶ οὗ πολὺς ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος about this we have much to say Hb 5:11. Hb is described as ὁ λ. τῆς παρακλήσεως a word of exhortation (in literary form) 13:22. Of writings that are part of Holy Scripture ὁ λ. Ἠσαί̈ου J 12:38. ὁ λ. ὁ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γεγραμμένος 15:25; ὁ προφητικὸς λ. 2 Pt 1:19; 2 Cl 11:2 (quot. of unknown orig.); AcPl Ha 8, 27/BMM recto 35 (Just., D. 77, 2 al.). ὁ ἅγιος λ. the holy word 1 Cl 56:3. ὁ λ. ὁ γεγραμμένος 1 Cor 15:54 (Is 25:8 and Hos 13:14 follow). Pl. οἱ λόγοι τ. προφητῶν Ac 15:15. ὡς γέγραπται ἐν βίβλῳ λόγων Ἠσαί̈ου Lk 3:4 (Pla., 7th Epistle 335a πείθεσθαι ἀεὶ χρὴ τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις; TestJob 1:1 βίβλος λόγων Ἰώβ; ParJer 9:32 v.l. τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν λόγων Ἱερεμίου; ApcEsdr 1:1 καὶ ἀποκάλυψις τοῦ … Ἐσδράμ; ApcSed prol.; Just., D. 72, 3f).—Of the content of Rv: ὁ ἀναγινώσκων τ. λόγους τῆς προφητείας 1:3. οἱ λόγοι (τ. προφητείας) τ. βιβλίου τούτου 22:7, 9f, 18f.

② computation, reckoning

ⓐ a formal accounting, esp. of one’s actions, and freq. with fig. extension of commercial terminology account, accounts, reckoning λόγον δοῦναι (Hdt. 8, 100; X., Cyr. 1, 4, 3; Diod S 3, 46, 4; SIG 1099, 16; BGU 164, 21; Jos., Ant. 16, 120; Just., D. 115, 6) give account, make an accounting ἕκαστος περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λόγον δώσει τ. θεῷ Ro 14:12. Also λ. ἀποδοῦναι abs. (Just., D. 116, 1 al.; Diod S 16, 56, 4; 19, 9, 4) Hb 13:17. τινί to someone (Diod S 16, 27, 4; Plut., Alcib. 7, 3; Chariton 7, 6, 2; SIG 631, 13 τᾷ πόλει; 2 Ch 34:28; Da 6:3 Theod.; Jos., Bell. 1, 209) τῷ ἑτοίμως ἔχοντι κρῖναι 1 Pt 4:5. τινὸς of someth. (SIG 1044, 46; 1105, 10 τοῦ ἀναλώματος; Jos., Ant. 19, 307) Lk 16:2 (here λ. w. the art.; on the subject of undergoing an audit cp. Aeschin. 3, 22). Likew. περί τινος (Diod S 18, 60, 2 δοὺς αὑτῷ περὶ τούτων λόγον=taking account [considering] with himself; BGU 98, 25 περὶ τούτου) Mt 12:36; Ac 19:40. ὑπέρ τινος concerning someone Hv 3, 9, 10.—αἰτεῖν τινα λόγον περί τινος call someone to account for someth. 1 Pt 3:15 (cp. Pla., Pol. 285e; Dio Chrys. 20 [37], 30; Apc4Esdr Fgm. b ἕκαστος ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκείου ἔργου τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτηθήσεται; Just., A I, 17, 4. For another perspective s. d below.).—Of banking responsibility ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ (PStras 72, 10 [III A.D.] ὁ τῶν θεῶν λ.; PHerm 108 [III A.D.] λ. τοῦ Σαραπείου) in wordplay Ac 6:2 (w. τράπεζα q.v. 1c); s. also 1aβ.—Of a ledger heading (POxy 1333 [II/III A.D.] δὸς αὐτῳ λόγῳ θεωρικῶν=credit him under ‘festivals’; for others s. Preisig., Wörterbuch s.v. λ. 14; s. also Fachwörter 119) Ro 9:6 (the point is that God’s ‘list’ of Israelites is accurate; on ἐκπίπτω in the sense ‘is not deficient’ s. s.v. 4); vs. 9 (the ‘count’ is subsumed by metonymy in divine promise); Gal 5:14 (all moral obligations come under one ‘entry’: ‘you shall love your neighbor as yourself’; for commercial association of ἀναλίσκω vs. 15, which rounds out the wordplay, s. s.v.). The contexts of these three passages suggest strong probability for commercial associations; for another view s. 1aβ.

ⓑ settlement (of an account) (εἰς λόγον commercial t.t. ‘in settlement of an account’ POxy 275, 19; 21) εἰς λόγον δόσεως κ. λήμψεως in settlement of a mutual account (lit., ‘of giving and receiving’, ‘of debit and credit’) Phil 4:15 (cp. Plut., Mor. 11b λόγον δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν; a parallel formulation POxy 1134,10 [421 A.D.] λ. λήμματος καὶ ἐξοδιασμοῦ=ledger of income and expenditures); for the linked accounting terms δόσις and λήμψις s. PCairMasp 151, 208 [VI A.D.]. The same ideas are in the background of εἰς λόγον ὑμῶν credited to your account vs 17.—συναίρειν λόγον settle accounts (BGU 775, 18f. The mid. in the same mng. PFay109, 6 [I A.D.]; POxy 113, 27f.—Dssm., LO 94 [LAE 118f]) μετά τινος Mt 18:23; 25:19.

ⓒ reflection, respect, regard εἰς λόγον τινός with regard to, for the sake of (Thu. 3, 46, 4; Demosth. 19, 142 εἰς ἀρετῆς λόγον; Polyb. 11, 28, 8; Ath. 31, 1; Ael. Aristid. 39 p. 743 D.: εἰς δεινότητος λ.) εἰς λ. τιμῆς IPhld 11:2. εἰς λ. θεοῦ ISm 10:1.

ⓓ reason for or cause of someth., reason, ground, motive (Just., D. 94, 3 δότε μοι λόγον, ὅτου χάριν … ; Ath. 30, 3 τὶς γὰρ … λόγος; Dio Chrys. 64 [14], 18 ἐκ τούτου τ. λόγου; Appian, Hann. 29 §126 τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ; Iambl., Vi. Pyth. 28, 155) τίνι λόγω; for what reason? Ac 10:29 (cp. Pla., Gorg. 512c τίνι δικαίῳ λ.; Appian, Mithrid. 57 §232 τίνι λόγῳ;). λόγον περὶ τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλπίδος 1 Pt 3:15 (but s. a above); κατὰ λόγον Ac 18:14 (s. κατά B 5bβ). παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας Mt 5:32; 19:9 v.l. (though 1aε is also poss.).

ⓔ πρὸς ὸ̔ν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος (ἐστίν) with whom we have to do (i.e. to reckon) (Dio Chrys. 31, 123; other exx. in FBleek, Hb II/1, 1836, 590ff), in his capacity as judge (Libanius, Legat. Ulixis [=Declamatio IV] 2 F. τοῖς δὲ ἀδίκως ἀποκτενοῦσι καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὁ λόγος γίγνεται) Hb 4:13. οὐ πρὸς σάρκα ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεόν he has to do not with flesh, but with God IMg 3:2.

ⓕ In Col 2:23 (s. 1aβ) λόγον μὲν ἔχοντα σοφίας may= make a case for wisdom (cp. λόγος ἡμῖν οὐδείς Plut., Mor. 870b).

③ the independent personified expression of God, the Logos. Our lit. shows traces of a way of thinking that was widespread in contemporary syncretism, as well as in Jewish wisdom lit. and Philo, the most prominent feature of which is the concept of the Logos, the independent, personified ‘Word’ (of God): GJs 11:2 (word of the angel to Mary) συνλήμψῃ ἐκ Λόγου αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ πάντων Δεσπότου). J 1:1abc, 14 (cp. Just., A I, 23, 2; Mel., P. 9, 61 and oft. by all apolog., exc.. Ar.). It is the distinctive teaching of the Fourth Gospel that this divine ‘Word’ took on human form in a historical person, that is, in Jesus (s. RSeeberg, Festgabe für AvHarnack ’21, 263–81.—Λόγος w. ζωή in gnostic speculation: Iren.1, 1, 1 [Harv. 1, 10, 4]; Aelian, VH 4, 20 ἐκάλουν τὸν Πρωταγόραν Λόγον. Similarly Favorinus [II A.D.]: Vorsokr. 80 A 1 ln. 22 [in Diog. L. 9, 50] of Democritus: ἐκαλεῖτο Σοφία. Equating a divinity with an abstraction that she personifies: Artem. 5, 18 φρόνησις εἶναι νομίζεται ἡ θεός [Athena]). Cp. 1J 1:1; Rv 19:13. εἷς θεός ἐστιν, ὁ φανερώσας ἑαυτὸν διὰ Ἰ. Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος, ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών there is one God, who has revealed himself through Jesus Christ his Son, who is his ‘Word’ proceeding from silence (i.e., without an oral pronouncement: in a transcendent manner) IMg 8:2 (s. σιγή). The Lord as νόμος κ. λόγος PtK 1. Cp. Dg 11:2, 3, 7, 8; 12:9.—HClavier, TManson memorial vol., ’59, 81–93: the Alexandrian eternal λόγος is also implied in Hb 4:12; 13:7.—S. also the ‘Comma Johanneum’ (to the bibliography in RGG³ I, ’54 [HGreeven] add AJülicher, GGA 1905, 930–35; AvHarnack, SBBerlAk 1915, 572f [=Studien I ’31, 151f]; MMeinertz, Einl. in d. NT⁴ ’33, 309–11; AGreiff, TQ 114, ’33, 465–80; CDodd, The Joh. Epistles ’46; WThiele, ZNW 50, ’59, 61–73) ὁ πατήρ, ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα 1J 5:7 v.l. (s. N. app.; Borger, TRu 52, ’87, 57f). (Such interpolations were not unheard of. According to Diog. L. 1, 48 some people maintain that Solon inserted the verse mentioning the Athenians after Il. 2, 557.—τῆς τριάδος, τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ Theoph. Ant. 2, 15 [p. 138, 19].)—On the Logos: EZeller, D. Philosophie der Griechen III 2⁴ 1903, 417–34; MHeinze, D. Lehre v. Logos in d. griech. Philosophie 1872; PWendland, Philo u. d. kynisch-stoische Diatribe (Beiträge z. Gesch. der griech. Philosophie u. Religion by Wendl. and OKern 1895, 1–75); AAall, Gesch. d. Logosidee 1896, 1899; MPohlenz, D. Stoa ’48f, I 482; 490 (index); LDürr, D. Wertung des göttl. Wortes im AT u. im ant. Orient ’38 (§9 of the Joh. Logos); EBréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie 1907, 83–111; (² ’25); JLebreton, Les théories du Logos au début de l’ère chrétienne 1907; ESchwartz, NGG 1908, 537–56; GVos, The Range of the Logos-Title in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel: PTR 11, 1913, 365–419; 557–602; RHarris, The Origin of the Prologue to St. John’s Gospel 1917, Athena, Sophia and the Logos: BJRL 7, 1, 1922 p. 56–72; M-JLagrange, Vers le Logos de S. Jean: RB 32, 1923, 161–84, Le Logos de Philon: ibid. 321–71; HLeisegang, Logos: Pauly-W. XIII 1926, 1035–81; TGlasson, Heraclitus’ Alleged Logos Doctr., JTS 3, ’52, 231–38.—NWeinstein, Z. Genesis d. Agada 1901, 29–90; Billerb. II 302–33.—Rtzst., Zwei religionsgeschichtl. Fragen 1901, 47–132, Mysterienrel.³ 1927, 428 index; WBousset, Kyrios Christos² 1921, 304ff; 316f; JKroll, D. Lehren d. Hermes Trismegistos1914, 418 index.—RBultmann, D. religionsgesch. Hintergrund des Prol. z. Joh.: HGunkel Festschr., 1923, II 1–26, Comm. ’41, 5ff; AAlexander, The Johannine Doctrine of the Logos: ET 36, 1925, 394–99; 467–72; (Rtzst. and) HSchaeder, Studien z. antiken Synkretismus 1926, 306–37; 350; GAvdBerghvanEysinga, In den beginne was de Logos: NThT 23, ’34, 105–23; JDillersberger, Das Wort von Logos ’35; RBury, The 4th Gosp. and the Logos-Doctrine ’40; EMay, CBQ 8, ’46, 438–47; GKnight, From Moses to Paul ’49, 120–29. TW IV 76–89; 126–40 (on this s. SLyonnet, Biblica 26, ’45, 126–31); CStange, ZST 21, ’50, 120–41; MBoismard, Le Prologue de St. Jean ’53; HLangkammer, BZ 9, ’65, 91–94; HRinggren, Word and Wisdom [hypostatization in Near East] ’47; WEltester, Haenchen Festschr., ’64, 109–34; HWeiss, Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie etc., TU 97, ’66, 216–82; MRissi, Die Logoslieder im Prolog des vierten Evangeliums, TZ 31, ’75, 321–36; HLausberg, NAWG, Ph. ’87, 1 pp. 1–7.—B. 1262. DELG s.v. λέγω B 1. M-M. EDNT. TW.

Y-y невольно пришло в голову, что... — Y couldn't help thinking that

• ПРИХОДИТЬ/ПРИЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <НА УМ, В УМ obs, НА МЫСЛЬ obs> кому coll; ВХОДИТЬ/ВОЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <В УМ, в МЫСЛЬ> obs, coll; ВСПАДАТЬ/ВСПАСТЬ НА УМ < НА МЫСЛЬ> obs

[VP; subj: abstr (usu. мысль, идея etc), (rare) concr or human, a clause, or infin; when foll. by infin, may convey s.o.'s intention or desire to do sth.]

=====

⇒ to arise in s.o.'s consciousness:

- Y-y пришёл в голову X ≈ X came into (entered) Y's head (mind);

- X crossed Y's mind;

- X occurred to Y;

- X came to mind;

- [in limited contexts] Y thought of X;

- it struck Y;

     ♦ "Мне тотчас же пришел в голову опять ещё вопрос: что Софья Семёновна, прежде чем заметит, пожалуй, чего доброго, потеряет деньги..." (Достоевский 3). "...Another question immediately came into my head Also: that Miss Marmeladov might well, for all I knew, lose the money before she noticed it..." (3a).

     ♦ Когда приходил к нему [Манилову] мужик и, почесавши рукою затылок, говорил: "Барин, позволь отлучиться на работу, подать заработать", - "Ступай", - говорил он, куря трубку, и ему даже в голову не приходило, что мужик шёл пьянствовать (Гоголь 3). Whenever a peasant came to him [Manilov] and, scratching the back of his head, said, "Master, give me leave to get an outside job, to pay off my taxes," Manilov invariably answered "Go," and puifed at his pipe; and it never entered his head that the peasant was merely oif on a drunken spree (3d).

     ♦...Иногда мне приходит на ум, что я что-то напутал в жизни, что не сделал чего-то самого главного, а чего именно - никак не могу вспомнить (Войнович 5)....Sometimes the thought crosses my mind that I've somehow messed up, that I've left the most important thing undone, but for the life of me, I can't remember just what that thing is (5a).

     ♦ В Лефортове удивительная библиотека: все книги, что конфисковывались у "врагов народа" за полвека, видно, стеклись сюда. По всей стране "чистили" библиотеки, жгли "вредные" книги - здесь же всё сохранилось, как в оазисе. Никому не приходило в голову чистить библиотеку тюрьмы КГБ... (Буковский 1). Lefortovo had a wonderful library - it looked as if all the books confiscated from the enemies of the people over half a century had ended up here. Up and down the country they had "purged" libraries and burned "pernicious" books, while in here, everything was preserved as in an oasis. It had never occurred to anyone to purge the libraries of the KGB prisons... (1a).

     ♦ Когда хочешь определить, где корни творчества Хемингуэя, на ум не приходит ни английская, ни французская, ни американская литература (Олеша 3). When you wish to determine where the roots of Hemingway's creative work lie, you don't think of English, French, or American literature (3a).

     ♦ В его голосе звучало такое искреннее убеждение, такая несомненная решимость, что мне невольно пришло на мысль: да, если этот человек не попадёт под суд, то он покажет, где раки зимуют! (Салтыков-Щедрин 2). There was such sincere conviction in his voice, such indomitable resolution in every word he uttered that I couldn't help thinking, "Ah, if this man's lucky enough to escape being put on trial, he'll certainly show them what's what!" (2a).

     ♦ Хотя мы и представительствовали в искусстве определённые социально-политические тенденции, однако никому из нас, разумеется, и во сне не приходило в голову, что где-то... у него лежит такой мандат: мы ещё в тринадцатом году перегрызли бы горло всякому, кто попытался бы уверить нас в этом... (Лившиц 1). [context transl] Although we represented definite socio-political tendencies in art, not one of us would have dreamed that he possessed such a mandate. In 1913 we would have throttled anyone who attempted to convince us of this... (1a).

• ПРИХОДИТЬ/ПРИЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <НА УМ, В УМ obs, НА МЫСЛЬ obs> кому coll; ВХОДИТЬ/ВОЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <В УМ, в МЫСЛЬ> obs, coll; ВСПАДАТЬ/ВСПАСТЬ НА УМ < НА МЫСЛЬ> obs

[VP; subj: abstr (usu. мысль, идея etc), (rare) concr or human, a clause, or infin; when foll. by infin, may convey s.o.'s intention or desire to do sth.]

=====

⇒ to arise in s.o.'s consciousness:

- Y-y пришёл в голову X ≈ X came into (entered) Y's head (mind);

- X crossed Y's mind;

- X occurred to Y;

- X came to mind;

- [in limited contexts] Y thought of X;

- it struck Y;

     ♦ "Мне тотчас же пришел в голову опять ещё вопрос: что Софья Семёновна, прежде чем заметит, пожалуй, чего доброго, потеряет деньги..." (Достоевский 3). "...Another question immediately came into my head Also: that Miss Marmeladov might well, for all I knew, lose the money before she noticed it..." (3a).

     ♦ Когда приходил к нему [Манилову] мужик и, почесавши рукою затылок, говорил: "Барин, позволь отлучиться на работу, подать заработать", - "Ступай", - говорил он, куря трубку, и ему даже в голову не приходило, что мужик шёл пьянствовать (Гоголь 3). Whenever a peasant came to him [Manilov] and, scratching the back of his head, said, "Master, give me leave to get an outside job, to pay off my taxes," Manilov invariably answered "Go," and puifed at his pipe; and it never entered his head that the peasant was merely oif on a drunken spree (3d).

     ♦...Иногда мне приходит на ум, что я что-то напутал в жизни, что не сделал чего-то самого главного, а чего именно - никак не могу вспомнить (Войнович 5)....Sometimes the thought crosses my mind that I've somehow messed up, that I've left the most important thing undone, but for the life of me, I can't remember just what that thing is (5a).

     ♦ В Лефортове удивительная библиотека: все книги, что конфисковывались у "врагов народа" за полвека, видно, стеклись сюда. По всей стране "чистили" библиотеки, жгли "вредные" книги - здесь же всё сохранилось, как в оазисе. Никому не приходило в голову чистить библиотеку тюрьмы КГБ... (Буковский 1). Lefortovo had a wonderful library - it looked as if all the books confiscated from the enemies of the people over half a century had ended up here. Up and down the country they had "purged" libraries and burned "pernicious" books, while in here, everything was preserved as in an oasis. It had never occurred to anyone to purge the libraries of the KGB prisons... (1a).

     ♦ Когда хочешь определить, где корни творчества Хемингуэя, на ум не приходит ни английская, ни французская, ни американская литература (Олеша 3). When you wish to determine where the roots of Hemingway's creative work lie, you don't think of English, French, or American literature (3a).

     ♦ В его голосе звучало такое искреннее убеждение, такая несомненная решимость, что мне невольно пришло на мысль: да, если этот человек не попадёт под суд, то он покажет, где раки зимуют! (Салтыков-Щедрин 2). There was such sincere conviction in his voice, such indomitable resolution in every word he uttered that I couldn't help thinking, "Ah, if this man's lucky enough to escape being put on trial, he'll certainly show them what's what!" (2a).

     ♦ Хотя мы и представительствовали в искусстве определённые социально-политические тенденции, однако никому из нас, разумеется, и во сне не приходило в голову, что где-то... у него лежит такой мандат: мы ещё в тринадцатом году перегрызли бы горло всякому, кто попытался бы уверить нас в этом... (Лившиц 1). [context transl] Although we represented definite socio-political tendencies in art, not one of us would have dreamed that he possessed such a mandate. In 1913 we would have throttled anyone who attempted to convince us of this... (1a).

• ПРИХОДИТЬ/ПРИЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <НА УМ, В УМ obs, НА МЫСЛЬ obs> кому coll; ВХОДИТЬ/ВОЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <В УМ, в МЫСЛЬ> obs, coll; ВСПАДАТЬ/ВСПАСТЬ НА УМ < НА МЫСЛЬ> obs

[VP; subj: abstr (usu. мысль, идея etc), (rare) concr or human, a clause, or infin; when foll. by infin, may convey s.o.'s intention or desire to do sth.]

=====

⇒ to arise in s.o.'s consciousness:

- Y-y пришёл в голову X ≈ X came into (entered) Y's head (mind);

- X crossed Y's mind;

- X occurred to Y;

- X came to mind;

- [in limited contexts] Y thought of X;

- it struck Y;

     ♦ "Мне тотчас же пришел в голову опять ещё вопрос: что Софья Семёновна, прежде чем заметит, пожалуй, чего доброго, потеряет деньги..." (Достоевский 3). "...Another question immediately came into my head Also: that Miss Marmeladov might well, for all I knew, lose the money before she noticed it..." (3a).

     ♦ Когда приходил к нему [Манилову] мужик и, почесавши рукою затылок, говорил: "Барин, позволь отлучиться на работу, подать заработать", - "Ступай", - говорил он, куря трубку, и ему даже в голову не приходило, что мужик шёл пьянствовать (Гоголь 3). Whenever a peasant came to him [Manilov] and, scratching the back of his head, said, "Master, give me leave to get an outside job, to pay off my taxes," Manilov invariably answered "Go," and puifed at his pipe; and it never entered his head that the peasant was merely oif on a drunken spree (3d).

     ♦...Иногда мне приходит на ум, что я что-то напутал в жизни, что не сделал чего-то самого главного, а чего именно - никак не могу вспомнить (Войнович 5)....Sometimes the thought crosses my mind that I've somehow messed up, that I've left the most important thing undone, but for the life of me, I can't remember just what that thing is (5a).

     ♦ В Лефортове удивительная библиотека: все книги, что конфисковывались у "врагов народа" за полвека, видно, стеклись сюда. По всей стране "чистили" библиотеки, жгли "вредные" книги - здесь же всё сохранилось, как в оазисе. Никому не приходило в голову чистить библиотеку тюрьмы КГБ... (Буковский 1). Lefortovo had a wonderful library - it looked as if all the books confiscated from the enemies of the people over half a century had ended up here. Up and down the country they had "purged" libraries and burned "pernicious" books, while in here, everything was preserved as in an oasis. It had never occurred to anyone to purge the libraries of the KGB prisons... (1a).

     ♦ Когда хочешь определить, где корни творчества Хемингуэя, на ум не приходит ни английская, ни французская, ни американская литература (Олеша 3). When you wish to determine where the roots of Hemingway's creative work lie, you don't think of English, French, or American literature (3a).

     ♦ В его голосе звучало такое искреннее убеждение, такая несомненная решимость, что мне невольно пришло на мысль: да, если этот человек не попадёт под суд, то он покажет, где раки зимуют! (Салтыков-Щедрин 2). There was such sincere conviction in his voice, such indomitable resolution in every word he uttered that I couldn't help thinking, "Ah, if this man's lucky enough to escape being put on trial, he'll certainly show them what's what!" (2a).

     ♦ Хотя мы и представительствовали в искусстве определённые социально-политические тенденции, однако никому из нас, разумеется, и во сне не приходило в голову, что где-то... у него лежит такой мандат: мы ещё в тринадцатом году перегрызли бы горло всякому, кто попытался бы уверить нас в этом... (Лившиц 1). [context transl] Although we represented definite socio-political tendencies in art, not one of us would have dreamed that he possessed such a mandate. In 1913 we would have throttled anyone who attempted to convince us of this... (1a).

• ПРИХОДИТЬ/ПРИЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <НА УМ, В УМ obs, НА МЫСЛЬ obs> кому coll; ВХОДИТЬ/ВОЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <В УМ, в МЫСЛЬ> obs, coll; ВСПАДАТЬ/ВСПАСТЬ НА УМ < НА МЫСЛЬ> obs

[VP; subj: abstr (usu. мысль, идея etc), (rare) concr or human, a clause, or infin; when foll. by infin, may convey s.o.'s intention or desire to do sth.]

=====

⇒ to arise in s.o.'s consciousness:

- Y-y пришёл в голову X ≈ X came into (entered) Y's head (mind);

- X crossed Y's mind;

- X occurred to Y;

- X came to mind;

- [in limited contexts] Y thought of X;

- it struck Y;

     ♦ "Мне тотчас же пришел в голову опять ещё вопрос: что Софья Семёновна, прежде чем заметит, пожалуй, чего доброго, потеряет деньги..." (Достоевский 3). "...Another question immediately came into my head Also: that Miss Marmeladov might well, for all I knew, lose the money before she noticed it..." (3a).

     ♦ Когда приходил к нему [Манилову] мужик и, почесавши рукою затылок, говорил: "Барин, позволь отлучиться на работу, подать заработать", - "Ступай", - говорил он, куря трубку, и ему даже в голову не приходило, что мужик шёл пьянствовать (Гоголь 3). Whenever a peasant came to him [Manilov] and, scratching the back of his head, said, "Master, give me leave to get an outside job, to pay off my taxes," Manilov invariably answered "Go," and puifed at his pipe; and it never entered his head that the peasant was merely oif on a drunken spree (3d).

     ♦...Иногда мне приходит на ум, что я что-то напутал в жизни, что не сделал чего-то самого главного, а чего именно - никак не могу вспомнить (Войнович 5)....Sometimes the thought crosses my mind that I've somehow messed up, that I've left the most important thing undone, but for the life of me, I can't remember just what that thing is (5a).

     ♦ В Лефортове удивительная библиотека: все книги, что конфисковывались у "врагов народа" за полвека, видно, стеклись сюда. По всей стране "чистили" библиотеки, жгли "вредные" книги - здесь же всё сохранилось, как в оазисе. Никому не приходило в голову чистить библиотеку тюрьмы КГБ... (Буковский 1). Lefortovo had a wonderful library - it looked as if all the books confiscated from the enemies of the people over half a century had ended up here. Up and down the country they had "purged" libraries and burned "pernicious" books, while in here, everything was preserved as in an oasis. It had never occurred to anyone to purge the libraries of the KGB prisons... (1a).

     ♦ Когда хочешь определить, где корни творчества Хемингуэя, на ум не приходит ни английская, ни французская, ни американская литература (Олеша 3). When you wish to determine where the roots of Hemingway's creative work lie, you don't think of English, French, or American literature (3a).

     ♦ В его голосе звучало такое искреннее убеждение, такая несомненная решимость, что мне невольно пришло на мысль: да, если этот человек не попадёт под суд, то он покажет, где раки зимуют! (Салтыков-Щедрин 2). There was such sincere conviction in his voice, such indomitable resolution in every word he uttered that I couldn't help thinking, "Ah, if this man's lucky enough to escape being put on trial, he'll certainly show them what's what!" (2a).

     ♦ Хотя мы и представительствовали в искусстве определённые социально-политические тенденции, однако никому из нас, разумеется, и во сне не приходило в голову, что где-то... у него лежит такой мандат: мы ещё в тринадцатом году перегрызли бы горло всякому, кто попытался бы уверить нас в этом... (Лившиц 1). [context transl] Although we represented definite socio-political tendencies in art, not one of us would have dreamed that he possessed such a mandate. In 1913 we would have throttled anyone who attempted to convince us of this... (1a).

• ПРИХОДИТЬ/ПРИЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <НА УМ, В УМ obs, НА МЫСЛЬ obs> кому coll; ВХОДИТЬ/ВОЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <В УМ, в МЫСЛЬ> obs, coll; ВСПАДАТЬ/ВСПАСТЬ НА УМ < НА МЫСЛЬ> obs

[VP; subj: abstr (usu. мысль, идея etc), (rare) concr or human, a clause, or infin; when foll. by infin, may convey s.o.'s intention or desire to do sth.]

=====

⇒ to arise in s.o.'s consciousness:

- Y-y пришёл в голову X ≈ X came into (entered) Y's head (mind);

- X crossed Y's mind;

- X occurred to Y;

- X came to mind;

- [in limited contexts] Y thought of X;

- it struck Y;

     ♦ "Мне тотчас же пришел в голову опять ещё вопрос: что Софья Семёновна, прежде чем заметит, пожалуй, чего доброго, потеряет деньги..." (Достоевский 3). "...Another question immediately came into my head Also: that Miss Marmeladov might well, for all I knew, lose the money before she noticed it..." (3a).

     ♦ Когда приходил к нему [Манилову] мужик и, почесавши рукою затылок, говорил: "Барин, позволь отлучиться на работу, подать заработать", - "Ступай", - говорил он, куря трубку, и ему даже в голову не приходило, что мужик шёл пьянствовать (Гоголь 3). Whenever a peasant came to him [Manilov] and, scratching the back of his head, said, "Master, give me leave to get an outside job, to pay off my taxes," Manilov invariably answered "Go," and puifed at his pipe; and it never entered his head that the peasant was merely oif on a drunken spree (3d).

     ♦...Иногда мне приходит на ум, что я что-то напутал в жизни, что не сделал чего-то самого главного, а чего именно - никак не могу вспомнить (Войнович 5)....Sometimes the thought crosses my mind that I've somehow messed up, that I've left the most important thing undone, but for the life of me, I can't remember just what that thing is (5a).

     ♦ В Лефортове удивительная библиотека: все книги, что конфисковывались у "врагов народа" за полвека, видно, стеклись сюда. По всей стране "чистили" библиотеки, жгли "вредные" книги - здесь же всё сохранилось, как в оазисе. Никому не приходило в голову чистить библиотеку тюрьмы КГБ... (Буковский 1). Lefortovo had a wonderful library - it looked as if all the books confiscated from the enemies of the people over half a century had ended up here. Up and down the country they had "purged" libraries and burned "pernicious" books, while in here, everything was preserved as in an oasis. It had never occurred to anyone to purge the libraries of the KGB prisons... (1a).

     ♦ Когда хочешь определить, где корни творчества Хемингуэя, на ум не приходит ни английская, ни французская, ни американская литература (Олеша 3). When you wish to determine where the roots of Hemingway's creative work lie, you don't think of English, French, or American literature (3a).

     ♦ В его голосе звучало такое искреннее убеждение, такая несомненная решимость, что мне невольно пришло на мысль: да, если этот человек не попадёт под суд, то он покажет, где раки зимуют! (Салтыков-Щедрин 2). There was such sincere conviction in his voice, such indomitable resolution in every word he uttered that I couldn't help thinking, "Ah, if this man's lucky enough to escape being put on trial, he'll certainly show them what's what!" (2a).

     ♦ Хотя мы и представительствовали в искусстве определённые социально-политические тенденции, однако никому из нас, разумеется, и во сне не приходило в голову, что где-то... у него лежит такой мандат: мы ещё в тринадцатом году перегрызли бы горло всякому, кто попытался бы уверить нас в этом... (Лившиц 1). [context transl] Although we represented definite socio-political tendencies in art, not one of us would have dreamed that he possessed such a mandate. In 1913 we would have throttled anyone who attempted to convince us of this... (1a).

• ПРИХОДИТЬ/ПРИЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <НА УМ, В УМ obs, НА МЫСЛЬ obs> кому coll; ВХОДИТЬ/ВОЙТИ В ГОЛОВУ <В УМ, в МЫСЛЬ> obs, coll; ВСПАДАТЬ/ВСПАСТЬ НА УМ < НА МЫСЛЬ> obs

[VP; subj: abstr (usu. мысль, идея etc), (rare) concr or human, a clause, or infin; when foll. by infin, may convey s.o.'s intention or desire to do sth.]

=====

⇒ to arise in s.o.'s consciousness:

- Y-y пришёл в голову X ≈ X came into (entered) Y's head (mind);

- X crossed Y's mind;

- X occurred to Y;

- X came to mind;

- [in limited contexts] Y thought of X;

- it struck Y;

     ♦ "Мне тотчас же пришел в голову опять ещё вопрос: что Софья Семёновна, прежде чем заметит, пожалуй, чего доброго, потеряет деньги..." (Достоевский 3). "...Another question immediately came into my head Also: that Miss Marmeladov might well, for all I knew, lose the money before she noticed it..." (3a).

     ♦ Когда приходил к нему [Манилову] мужик и, почесавши рукою затылок, говорил: "Барин, позволь отлучиться на работу, подать заработать", - "Ступай", - говорил он, куря трубку, и ему даже в голову не приходило, что мужик шёл пьянствовать (Гоголь 3). Whenever a peasant came to him [Manilov] and, scratching the back of his head, said, "Master, give me leave to get an outside job, to pay off my taxes," Manilov invariably answered "Go," and puifed at his pipe; and it never entered his head that the peasant was merely oif on a drunken spree (3d).

     ♦...Иногда мне приходит на ум, что я что-то напутал в жизни, что не сделал чего-то самого главного, а чего именно - никак не могу вспомнить (Войнович 5)....Sometimes the thought crosses my mind that I've somehow messed up, that I've left the most important thing undone, but for the life of me, I can't remember just what that thing is (5a).

     ♦ В Лефортове удивительная библиотека: все книги, что конфисковывались у "врагов народа" за полвека, видно, стеклись сюда. По всей стране "чистили" библиотеки, жгли "вредные" книги - здесь же всё сохранилось, как в оазисе. Никому не приходило в голову чистить библиотеку тюрьмы КГБ... (Буковский 1). Lefortovo had a wonderful library - it looked as if all the books confiscated from the enemies of the people over half a century had ended up here. Up and down the country they had "purged" libraries and burned "pernicious" books, while in here, everything was preserved as in an oasis. It had never occurred to anyone to purge the libraries of the KGB prisons... (1a).

     ♦ Когда хочешь определить, где корни творчества Хемингуэя, на ум не приходит ни английская, ни французская, ни американская литература (Олеша 3). When you wish to determine where the roots of Hemingway's creative work lie, you don't think of English, French, or American literature (3a).

     ♦ В его голосе звучало такое искреннее убеждение, такая несомненная решимость, что мне невольно пришло на мысль: да, если этот человек не попадёт под суд, то он покажет, где раки зимуют! (Салтыков-Щедрин 2). There was such sincere conviction in his voice, such indomitable resolution in every word he uttered that I couldn't help thinking, "Ah, if this man's lucky enough to escape being put on trial, he'll certainly show them what's what!" (2a).

     ♦ Хотя мы и представительствовали в искусстве определённые социально-политические тенденции, однако никому из нас, разумеется, и во сне не приходило в голову, что где-то... у него лежит такой мандат: мы ещё в тринадцатом году перегрызли бы горло всякому, кто попытался бы уверить нас в этом... (Лившиц 1). [context transl] Although we represented definite socio-political tendencies in art, not one of us would have dreamed that he possessed such a mandate. In 1913 we would have throttled anyone who attempted to convince us of this... (1a).